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International Cooperation on Climate Change Mitigation: The role of 
climate clubs 
 








We know the science of climate change; we know the economics of climate change; we also 
know the law of climate change. However, we do not know how countries may come together 
to cooperate on climate change mitigation. One way of doing so successfully is by putting 
together the climate regime with the international trading system via the creation of climate 
clubs, namely the coalition of the willing. This article aims to explain that, by building climate 
clubs and making use of the international trading system, we can reach a better future for all. 
 
I. Introduction 
Ideologies such as nationalism and socialism have tried to explain social relations in the world. 
Following changes in the global economy, recent books have addressed new social trends that 
result in the world not being what societal institutions are supposed to make of the world, 
namely a reasonably fair place, a more generous and inclusive society.1 This article tries to use 
climate clubs2 in the context of the international trading system to reach a sustainable and 
prosperous future. 
 
In recent years, we have observed warmer temperatures, increasing numbers of floods, forest 
degradation,3 forest fires, and droughts, among other natural catastrophes. Where drought has 
become a perennial problem, adaptation has become the norm.  
 
 
 Jean Monnet Chaired Professor in EU International Economic Law and Professor of Law, Queen Mary 
University of London (Centre for Commercial Law Studies), United Kingdom. Visiting Professor, New York 
University Abu Dhabi (UAE). Inaugural Lee Kong Chian International Visiting Professor, Singapore 
Management University School of Law, Singapore. Member, Madrid Bar. Ph.D., European University Institute; 
M.Res., European University Institute; J.S.M., Stanford Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School; M.Phil., 
London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., Granada University; B.A., Granada University. Email: 
r.leal-arcas@qmul.ac.uk 
 Independent legal researcher. 
1 See for instance M. Carney, Value(s): Building a Better World for All, Signal Books, 2021; M. Shafik, What We 
Owe Each Other: A New Social Contract for a Better Society, Princeton University Press, 2021; J. Norberg, Open: 
The Story of Human Progress, Atlantic Books, 2020. 
2 A climate club is understood as a coalition of countries that commit to strong steps to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and may have mechanisms to penalize countries that do not participate. See W. Nordhaus, “The Climate 
Club: How to fix a failing global effort,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020, p. 10, available at 
https://pcfraz.org/resources/Documents/The%20Climate%20Club%20_%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf. 
3 When Joe Biden of the US complained to President Bolsonaro of Brazil in September 2020 that he should stop 
cutting trees in the Amazon, the Brazilian president twitted: “Our sovereignty is non-negotiable.” See O. Stunkel, 
“How Biden can change Bolsonaro’s mind on the Amazon,” Americas Quarterly, 11 January 2021, available at 
https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/how-biden-can-change-bolsonaros-mind-on-the-amazon/. The 
European Union has similar concerns with Mercosur over rampant deforestation in the Amazon, which will 
determine whether the Europeans will ratify a recently concluded free trade agreement with Mercosur. 
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As of 2020, the consumption of coal in the US and Europe had fallen by 34% since 2009, 
mainly due to government policy and cheaper energy alternatives. However, coal still 
represents around 27% of the raw energy necessary to power our daily activities4 and, in some 
developed countries, coal is the main cause of air pollution.5 For some countries that are still 
developing their economies, dismissing coal may mean dismissing their right of developing 
countries to choose their own energy source for economic growth.6 By producing GDP, 
countries extract natural resources and dump waste back into nature. As solar farms and 
onshore wind energy become increasingly cheaper (in fact, they are the cheapest source of new 
electricity for around 66% of the world’s population), coal will face fierce competition.7 In the 
US, the Biden administration intends to boost the off-shore wind-energy industry by deploying 
30 gigawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2030.8 
 
This article aims to explain that, by building climate clubs and making use of the international 
trading system, we can reach a better future for all. After this introduction, Section II provides 
the analytical framework, Section III sets the scene, whereas Section IV offers an analysis of 
climate clubs. Section V conceptualizes climate clubs in the context of international trade, 
whereas Sections VI and VII conclude the article and offer some light to the future, 
respectively. 
II. Analytical Framework 
We know the science of climate change; we know the economics of climate change; we also 
know the law of climate change. However, we do not know how countries may come together 
to cooperate on climate change mitigation. One way of doing so successfully is by putting 
together the climate regime with the international trading system via the creation of climate 
clubs, namely the coalition of the willing. These clubs can be parallel to, within, or outside the 
UNFCCC. The result may be a club of sorts: of national carbon taxes or carbon-market 
coalitions. 
 
While President Trump opted to ditch the Paris Climate Agreement, the European Union (EU) 
thinks there is now scope for a plethora of joint initiatives as President Biden reversed course 
by returning the US to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.9 These initiatives include 
cooperating on regulation for sustainable finance, building on the EU’s so-called green 
taxonomy, forming a “green tech alliance” on clean technologies, collaborating on carbon 
pricing, and forming a Trade and Climate Initiative within the World Trade Organization.  
The use of trade as a tool for climate action can go a long way. It is not just punitive. It can 
also be cooperative mechanisms where the environmental exceptions within Article XX of the 
GATT can be broadened to allow people to pursue more ambitious climate and environmental 
domestic policies, where one can work with countries and bilateral trade agreements to expand 
clean energy trade and investment as well as cooperation on technology. 
 
4 The Economist, “Make coal history,” 5 December 2020, p. 13. 
5 Of the 100 European cities with the highest level of air pollution, 29 are in Poland. See The Economist, “Graphic 
detail: Coal-fired heating pollutes Poland’s skies,” 30 January 2021, p. 73. 
6 The Economist, 2 January 2021, p. 12. 
7 The Economist, “Make coal history,” 5 December 2020, p. 13. 
8 The Economist, 3 April 2021, p. 8. 
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If we are serious about deep decarbonization, we are going to need large amounts of clean 
energy trade around the world. We should think about countries that are very good at 
producing cheap batteries, solar panels, and other emerging technologies. We are going to 
need a lot more trade in those technologies around the world. 
Instead of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, some economists such as Scott Barret or 
William Nordhaus prefer a climate-club approach to climate-change mitigation, a climate 
club-type approach for more effective climate-change mitigation. This idea of a climate club 
is, among other things, about border adjustments to level the playing field. Beyond levelling 
the playing field, a climate club is intentionally punitive to incentivize countries to do things 
that their domestic political system will not support. 
The climate-club concept is a very interesting idea for how one can come together with a set 
of countries and then encourage and force other countries to escalate their ambition. Three 
indicators seem relevant to give legitimacy to a climate club: 1) how much of the world’s 
population it represents; 2) coverage of the world’s GDP; and 3) level of GHG emissions’ 
coverage. On this point of indicators, around 50% of humanity lives within the world’s ten 
largest economies. Bringing together these economies would make an effective climate club. 
However, one needs to think carefully about what happens after that, how countries respond 
to it, and whether that may cause a breakdown of much of the international trading system that 
is so important and necessary to advance trade in clean technologies. 
Three characteristics appear evident for the creation of a climate club: 
1. Most big GHG emitters need to be members of the club; 
2. Membership benefits are a must, and they should outweigh obligations; and 
3. The club would need to be related to sanctions for non-compliance. 
One would need to make sure that such sanctions would not violate international law and/or 
World Trade Organization (WTO) legal rules. However, one should be concerned about the 
overuse of sanctions as a tool of diplomacy and economic statecraft. One should also take into 
account the response to retaliation and escalation resulting from sanctions in climate clubs. In 
William Nordhaus’s analysis, the level of sanction of border adjustment required to do the job 
is not just on the carbon intensity of carbon-intensive goods and services; rather, it is across 
the entire economy.10 
More than 100 countries/trading blocs, many of the biggest companies,11 and 400 cities have 
promised to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The EU, the UK, South Korea, and Japan 
are among them. China said it will get there by 2060. This means that their economies will not 
put more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than they take out, which will come at an 
enormous economic price. It remains to be seen whether voters in liberal democracies will 
accept higher energy prices to fix climate change. President Biden of the US is also keen to 
reach that target by 2050. Doing so puts all these economies in line with the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 
Therefore, those six players, among others, are ideal candidates for a climate club.  
 
 
10 William Nordhaus, “A New Solution: The Climate Club,” The New York Review of Books, 2015, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/new-solution-climate-club/ 
11 https://carbon.ci/insights/companies-with-net-zero-targets/. 
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Along the same lines, we would argue that (major emitting) companies should also create their 
climate club. Why? Because companies are on the front line on issues such as climate change 
and some have promised to be carbon-neutral by 2050. In addition, we could have a green 
recovery, turning the covid crisis into a climate opportunity,12 whether in COP26 or China 
stating that it will reduce the carbon intensity of GDP by 18% between 2021 and 202513 and 
by 65% by 2030 (based on the 2005 levels), and go net-zero by 2060.14 
 
The world has moved from hyperglobalization (in the words of Dani Rodrik)15 to localization, 
characterized by national protectionism. Regionalism can be explained by the fact that 
globalization peaked in 2007-2008 and, since then, we have seen the rise of regional blocs, 
slowbalization, and localization. In the context of climate change mitigation, this reality 
explains why countries may be thinking about the creation of climate clubs (as examples of 
regional/plurilateral arrangements, as opposed to a global architecture). 
III. Setting the Scene 
 
The shortcomings of multilateralism are well understood. Often treaty regimes, albeit by 
design, contain such limitations that consensus is necessary for their further development, 
including the subsequent imposition of binding obligations upon their parties. Consensus, on 
the other hand, is not easy to come by, given the complexities of negotiations among a plurality 
of states with extremely diverse interests and capabilities. This is even more so when it comes 
to climate mitigation, given the structural and other challenges of taking meaningful action. 
Case in point being the universal, multilateral climate governance regime par excellence, 
namely the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),16 the 
overall governance of which is provided by its Conference of the Parties (COP) through its 
annual meetings ever since its advent. The UNFCCC is predicated on consensus-based 
approaches to rulemaking, resulting in standoffs between parties, given the disparity of, among 
other things, interests, capabilities, abatement capacity, and development level.17  
 
Moreover, the rise of greater protectionist reflexes during times of economic crisis (cf. 
the ongoing global recession following the 2008 financial crisis that is likely to be further 
compounded by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic) have a corroding effect on multilateralism 
in various fields of international cooperation (cf., among other things, the European Union 
(EU) and Brexit,18 the resetting of North American economic cooperation by the Trump 
 
12 Restrictions related to covid caused a 6% reduction in energy-related global CO2 emissions in 2020. The decline 
in road activity accounted for 50% of the fall in demand for oil and 35% came from aviation. The Economist, 6 
March 2021, p. 7. 
13 The Economist, 13 March 2021, p. 5. 
14 The Economist, “Cleaning Up: Can China’s carbon market take off?” 27 February 2021, p. 57. 
15 D. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the future of the world economy, W. W. Norton & Co., 
2011. 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, Rep. of 
the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1  
17 J. Vogel, (2014). The problem with consensus in the U.N. Framework convention on climate change. 
Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly, 32(2), 14–21  
18 In relation to its Brexit and collective climate abatement, following its departure from the EU on January 31, 
2020, the United Kingdom (UK) committed to participate in the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) during the transition period until the end of 2020. UK installations therefore continued to face compliance 
obligations for their 2019 and 2020 emissions. In February 2020, the UK published its approach to negotiating 
the future relationship with the EU, in which the UK stated that its future carbon pricing initiative will support its 
net zero by 2050 target. It is also considering a link between any future UK ETS and the EU ETS, similarly to the 
Swiss-EU ETS linking model. This would allow allowances to be exchanged between the two systems. However, 
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administration with the replacement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),19 and currency and trade 
antagonisms between the United States (US) and China). Arguably, a further casualty of such 
global dynamics is the willingness of the international community to commit to binding and 
enforceable ambitious targets within the context of the UNFCCC and its successive 
agreements. To begin with, the agreements reached within the context of the UNFCCC have 
been relatively anemic given their modest goals and/or lack of enforcement and, thus, their 
limited capacity to meaningfully forestall potentially catastrophic climatic impacts caused by 
human activity. Such half-hearted and, in the event, fateful, multilateralism seems ripe for 
reconsideration. In the absence, therefore, of some effective nigh-universal binding top-down 
regime to meaningfully regulate emissions, it is vital to look at other means of achieving or, at 
the very least, approximating the necessary abatement targets.  
 
What is more, a number of commentators, including Professor and Nobel Laureate 
William Nordhaus, consider a pernicious aspect of the existing multilateral order to be its scope 
for freeriding20 and, therefore, that solutions must be designed to reduce or altogether eliminate 
such scope. However, as the notion of freeriding generally concerns the enjoyment of a benefit 
without contributing to its cost, it does not entirely tally with the realities of climate change, 
given that such freeriding has less to do with states enjoying a benefit cost-free, and more to 
do with states actually not suffering potential anticompetitive effects to their economies by not 
implementing meaningful carbon abatement measures. What is more, the global 
commons/public good to be defended within the context of multilateral climate mitigation 
efforts remains somewhat elusive.21 In that sense, it is not clear how freeriding arguments may 
 
fallback options, such as a standalone UK ETS and a long-term carbon tax, are also being considered by the UK 
government has therefore legislated provisions for both a UK ETS and carbon tax as part of its 2020 legislative 
proposals. For more background information see World Bank. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2020 (May), 
World Bank, Washington, DC. (39). 
19 The USCMA entered into force on July 1, 2020. See the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
website for the US view on the USCMA’s objectives: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement. Also, for the text of USCMA see:  https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between.  
20 W. Nordhaus (2020, May/June) The Climate Club: How to Fix a Failing Global Effort, Foreign Affairs. 
Nordhaus discusses such dynamic thus, “Free-riding is a major hurdle to addressing global externalities, and it 
lies at the heart of the failure to deal with climate change. Consider a voluntary agreement, such as the Kyoto 
Protocol or the Paris accord. No single country has an incentive to cut its emissions sharply. Suppose that when 
Country A spends $100 on abatement, global damages decline by $200 but Country A might get only $20 worth 
of the benefits: its national cost-benefit analysis would lead it not to undertake the abatement. Hence, nations have 
a strong incentive not to participate in such agreements. If they do participate, there is a further incentive to 
understate their emissions or to miss ambitious objectives. The outcome is a noncooperative free-riding 
equilibrium, in which few countries undertake strong climate change policies—a situation that closely resembles 
the current international policy environment.” However, it is not clear what are the ‘global damages’ that decline 
by $200, or how Country A only benefits by $20 vis-à-vis its $100 outlay while a freeriding Country B also 
benefits presumably by $20 while not spending a dime. Also see W. Nordhaus (2015) Climate Clubs: Overcoming 
Free-riding in International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, 105(4): 1339-1370 where the issue of 
freeriding is analyzed in greater detail. In sum, the issue pertains to how abatement costs (often prohibitive and 
damaging for competitiveness) accrue nationally while the benefits of abatement accrue globally and are 
independent of where emissions take place. Moreover, given that cost of abatement, many states choose not to 
participate as the penalties are lower than such costs. This results in low participation rates but also low penalties 
given that so few states are in the climate club in question. Therefore, trade sanctions on non-participants seem to 
be indispensable, albeit highly controversial given their implications for global trade. 
21 Things such as clean air, public health, water quality, the integrity of ecosystems, and so on, are public goods. 
Environmental degradation does not limit itself to national borders; that much is clear. Yet the notion of global 
commons/public goods remains elusive although that need not inhabit in the slightest the need for the international 
community to take meaningful action to address climate change, particularly when the current overall objective 
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be framed within the context of the enjoyment on the part of a state of some benefit cost-free 
when that benefit pertains to averting environmental degradation, which, after all, may impact 
states differently. For instance, the current state of play – i.e., the inadequacy of existing global 
abatement efforts for containing average global temperature increases by 2100 to no more than 
2°C over pre-industrial levels –22  would have very different implications for Mauritius than 
for Russia, given that such failure would pose an existential threat to the former, while 
potentially advantageous to the latter.23  
 
Disparities between parties to the UNFCCC, including their historical cumulative 
emissions, abatement capacity, and level of development, provide useful context as to why 
differentiations in multilateral efforts exist and may be entirely valid.24 In fact, the notion of 
common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) is a principle that is deployed across many 
multilateral environmental agreements, including the UNFCCC. Article 3 of the UNFCCC 
states that,  
 
of ensuring that average global temperatures do not rise above 2°C by 2100 is sufficiently specific for states to 
consider how to go about collectively to achieve this common goal. In that sense, the global public good is to 
preserve the integrity of the global ecosystem to its projected state following an increase of no more than 2°C over 
pre-industrial levels. The global public good in that sense accrues intergenerationally. Others have posited that 
“the stability of the Earth’s climate is a global public good”. See L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) 
Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 
21 (3), 177.  
22 It is worth noting that the end of 2020 marked the moment under the Paris Agreement ‘ratchet mechanism’ 
when parties were expected to formally submit more ambitious emissions reduction commitments in relation to 
their 2030 targets. However, just 45 parties (44 countries, plus the EU sui juris) met this deadline. After a year 
disrupted by the global pandemic states responsible for only c. 28% of global emissions registered new or updated 
‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) on the UN’s official registry by the end of 2020 (cf. 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/LatestSubmissions.aspx). Some emitters did register their 
NDCs in time, including the UK and the EU, but there were also major absences including China, India, and the 
US. Even among the new submissions many lacked increases in ambition since their first pledges made previously 
(2015), or even backtracked with scaled-back proposals. However, one expert, Professor Niklas Höhne, as 
reported by Josh Gabbariss for Carbon Brief, assesses collective plans to be still ‘totally off’ what is required to 
achieve Paris Agreement targets. See J. Gabbariss (2021, January 8). Analysis: Which countries met the UN’s 
2020 deadline to raise ‘climate ambition’?. CarbonBrief. https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-
met-the-uns-2020-deadline-to-raise-climate-ambition. According to the analysis presented by Climate Action 
Tracker, just 8 parties (7 states plus the EU sui juris) have submitted stronger NDC targets than their previous 
commitments and 118 parties have not updated targets altogether. As of February 3, 2021, new NDC submissions 
covered c. 31.6% of global emissions and 25.2% of the global population. See 
https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/.  
23 See M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic 
Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373 (2014), 383, where it is stated that, “Russia’s official 
attitude towards climate change is hesitant because of the perceived benefits to it of climate change and its self-
proclaimed ‘better’ ability to deal with climate change than other nations.”  
24 Among other things, such differentiations in the distribution of obligations, albeit temporary in some cases, are 
witnessed not only in the UNFCCC’s principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) but also the 
notion of special and differential treatment (SDT) as reflected across various provisions within the context of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), including the Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (commonly referred to as the ‘Enabling Clause’) 
that serves as the basis for the WTO’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). For a fuller account of SDT 
provisions within the WTO order see Development: Trade and Development Committee (WTO) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm. See also the 27 Rio 
Principles found in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro. Principle 6 states: “The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least 
developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority.”  
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parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of future and present generations of 
human kind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibility and respective capabilities.  
 
In that sense, CBDR affirms that, while it is a common responsibility of all states to protect the 
integrity of the environment, some should take stronger action than others. The justification for 
differentiated responsibilities is twofold: first, those that have most heavily contributed to (and 
benefited from) the accumulation of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have a 
greater burden of responsibility and, second, those that have greater abatement capability, on 
account of access to resources, including wealth and technology, should contribute more. 
Against the above context, freeriding arguments may be falling short of properly reflecting the 
complexities of global climate policy. 
 
That being said, the literature is rife with, among other things, game theoretical 
conceptualizations, but also scrutiny of trends in state practice, suggesting perhaps too great a 
role of the scope for freeriding in multilateralist failure concerning global abatement efforts. 
For instance, when one considers international cooperation in relation to environmental 
protection, it is apparent that the goal – namely the prevention of the sort of environmental 
degradation that would pose serious threats to human, animal, and plant life and health – 
actually pertains to a transboundary, intergenerational common good. Securing such an 
objective benefits the entire international community, including fully developed and post-
industrial states – responsible for historical and ongoing emissions – but also developing states 
whose development is emissions-intensive (e.g. China and India, among others). It is not only 
those coastal including island states facing threats to their existence that are set to benefit from 
global temperature stabilization. However, those not facing existential threats are, therefore, 
tempted to shirk the likely economic burdens of abatement, particularly when the development 
of their economies is a higher priority.  
 
Although, as discussed above, this is not freeriding in the sense of enjoying some 
existing benefit the cost of which burdens others, strictly speaking, such states are relieved of 
the current and ongoing cost of action necessary to safeguard an existing and future benefit. In 
future, should environmental collapse be averted, it is only then that such states would enjoy 
the benefits (or rather the felicitous preclusion of climatic collapse along with the rest of 
international community) of climatic integrity without having borne the economic, and 
potentially social and political, costs of the requisite abatement efforts. Notions from game 
theory offer perhaps cynical, albeit insightful, glimpses into the ways of statecraft. What we 
may witness is reverse Beggar-Thy-Neighbor effects,25 whereby, assuming burdens accrued 
domestically (that is to say, the cost of abatement) actually translates into benefits to one’s 
neighbors (that is to say, to those who bore no such costs).  
 
Undoubtedly, this is all moot should failure to take meaningful action result in the sort 
of climatic degradation about which scientists have long warned the international community. 
IV. Climate Clubs: Minilateralist Paths to Climate Mitigation 
 
 
25 The concept of ‘Beggar-Thy-Neighbor’ pertains to the likely negative implications of a state’s economic 
policies for the economic interests of other states. This 18th-century notion originates in the writings of Adam 
Smith (see An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter III). Reverse 
Beggar-Thy-Neighbor effects would involve just the opposite – namely costly domestic measures on the part of 
one state resulting in free benefits to other states.  
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Nordhaus so aptly highlights how climate mitigation solutions must also be sought 
outside a multilateralism that, under its current form, has persistently failed to produce a legally 
binding international agreement on climate change when one considers the last twenty-five 
years or so of its life, namely since the 1990s.26 Such solutions must be well attuned to the 
realities of failed multilateralism, including the lack of adequate and binding targets, incentives, 
and penalties to achieve critical mass in global mitigation efforts, hence why Nordhaus calls 
for some complementary solution to multilateralism – namely the climate club model – that 
takes stock of existing pitfalls. 
 
There is extensive literature exploring or advocating solutions beyond multilateralism, 
namely minilateralist solutions,27 that is to say, solutions that involve at least three parties (be 
they jurisdictions or states).28 The idea that groups of states/jurisdictions can come together to 
develop and pursue specific common objectives concerning their shared interests is not new. 
In fact, it is at least as old as the rise of empires in the Bronze Age, where separate realms 
would oscillate between warfare and peace to, among other things, advance their trade interests 
through coalitions and arrangements (cf. the Amarna letters containing diplomatic 
correspondence in Akkadian, the diplomatic lingua franca, between the Great Powers of the 
Ancient East Mediterranean/Near East and their vassals during the late half of the 2nd 
millennium BCE29) to the exclusion of others. In that sense, such modalities of inter-state 
cooperation that rely on obligations, sticks, and carrots are far from novel.  
 
Terms of convenience encountered in the literature that pertain to such minilateralist 
solutions include climate clubs, carbon clubs, carbon market clubs, club-like arrangements, 
and climate mitigation clubs. However, the nomenclature is incidental as what actually matters 
is the content of such arrangements,30 as is discussed throughout the present publication. What 
 
26 W. Nordhaus (2020, May/June) The Climate Club: How to Fix a Failing Global Effort, Foreign Affairs. 
Nordhaus states that, “The bottom line is that climate policy has not progressed over the last three decades. The 
dangers of global warming are much better understood, but nations have not adopted effective policies to slow 
the coming peril”.  
27 Among others, W. Nordhaus (2020, May/June) The Climate Club: How to Fix a Failing Global Effort, Foreign 
Affairs; M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 
'Magic Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373; L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) 
Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 
21 (3); J. Hovi, D.F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, and A. Underdal (2016) Climate change mitigation: a role for climate 
clubs? Palgrave Communications. 2:16020; R. Falkner (2015) A minilateral solution for global climate change? 
On bargaining efficiency, club benefits and international legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change. Economics and 
Policy. Working Paper No. 222, London, UK; Victor D G (2015) The Case for Climate Clubs. International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum: Geneva, Switzerland; J. Morgan 
and L. Weischer (2012, October 29). Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of Countries Can Make A Big 
Difference on Climate Change (World Resources Institute); J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen & A. Underdal (2017) 
The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation? B. J. Pol. S 49 1071-1096; D. G. Victor 
(2015) The Case for Climate Clubs. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015. www.e15initiative.org/; W. Nordhaus (2015) Climate 
Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, 105(4): 1339-1370; 
and N. Martin and J. C. J. M. van den Bergh (2019) A multi-level climate club with national and sub-national 
members: theory and application to US states. Environ. Res. Lett. 14 124049.  
28 See J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen & A. Underdal (2017) The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate 
Co-operation? B. J. Pol. S 49 1071-1096 where they define a climate club “as any international actor (country) 
group that (1) starts with fewer members than the UNFCCC has and (2) aims to co-operate on climate change 
mitigation” (1072).  
29 See S. Izre’el, The Amarna Tablets for background information and access to particular portions of the corpus, 
https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/semitic/amarna.html  
30 See L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big 
Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 21 (3), where the authors argue that the term ‘clubs’ includes 
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is crucial is whether such minilateralist formations pertain exclusively or partially to climate 
mitigation, are impactful, and are capable of bringing collective efforts on track to meeting 
global abatement objectives.  
 
While minilateralist approaches are predicated on coalitions of the willing,31 there is 
limited effectiveness in merely clubbing together the most ardent of environmentalist states if 
they do not include the most emitting or, at the very least, if they do not include such states 
with the necessary geopolitical and geo-economic clout to draw in the most emitting players. 
For instance, the top four (by global share) emitters, namely China, the US, the EU27 plus the 
UK, and India, have collectively contributed to 55 per cent of total global GHG emissions over 
the last decade, while, collectively, G20 members are responsible for 78 per cent of total GHG 
emissions,32 and, therefore, what these states, either separately or jointly, do to mitigate or 
compound climate change rightly attracts intense scrutiny. For instance, according to the latest 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap report, collectively, G20 
members are currently not on track to achieving their unconditional nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs), as some are on track, others are falling short, while for others, it is 
unclear.33 What is clear, however, is that the emissions gap – i.e. the discrepancy between 
current commitments and those needed to limit average temperature rises by the end of the 
century to a maximum of 2°C – remains gaping.34  
 
Moreover, such minilateralism need not be antagonistic towards multilateralism,35 and 
often minilateralist initiatives purport to be complimentary towards the latter, although, as 
 
“any grouping that comprises more than two and less than the full multilateral set of countries party to the 
UNFCCC and that has not reached the degree of institutionalization of an international organization. While clubs 
may include other stakeholders, they are predominantly governed and funded by national governments. This broad 
definition can include very different degrees of formality and organization. Regular conferences and meetings, as 
well as groupings frequently referred to as ‘initiatives’, ‘forums’ or ‘partnerships’, are, for the purposes of this 
chapter, all included in the ‘clubs’ term. We exclusively consider clubs that discuss and promote greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions or a sub-issue directly relevant to climate change mitigation, such as the promotion of 
renewable energies.” (emphasis added) (177).  
31 See J. Bacchus, The Willing World: Shaping and Sharing a Sustainable Global Prosperity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018, in which Bacchus makes the case for global action and multilateralism, based 
on the rule of law, on the part of willing actors in a manner that optimally promotes both environmental and 
economic objectives.  
32 United Nations Environment Programme (2020). Emissions Gap Report 2020 – Executive summary. Nairobi, 
v-vi. https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2020.  
33 Ibid. viii. 
34 To track progress of global decarbonization efforts, UNEP collects data and compiles periodic reports to assess 
discrepancies between the purported goals and the situation on the ground. This discrepancy is known as the 
‘emissions gap’. Successive reports highlight the inadequacy of global efforts. To mark the ten-year anniversary 
since the first assessment, the UNEP published an assessment report taking stock of action over the ensuing 
decade, which makes for sober reading in that it finds that despite a decade of “increasing political and social 
focus on climate change and the milestone Paris Agreement, global greenhouse…emissions have not been curbed, 
and the emissions gap is larger than ever”. What is more, it states that “…essentially, there has been no real change 
in the global emissions pathway in the last decade. The effects of climate policies have been too small to offset 
the impact of key drivers of emissions such as economic growth and population growth…. [T]he fact remains that 
at the global scale we have failed to bridge or even narrow the 2020 emissions gap… if the Paris goals are to be 
kept viable, the world cannot afford to lose another decade.’ Altogether, ambition and action over the past decade 
have simply been inadequate, so action now needs to be faster and more transformational.” (emphasis added). 
See J. Christensen, and A. Olhoff (2019). Lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments. United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi (1, 3, and 4) https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-
10-year-summary.  
35 See Victor (2015) The Case for Climate Clubs. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015 (8) who states that minilateralist 
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some commentators have analyzed, minilateralism engenders fragmentation in global climate 
governance, with varied implications for multilateralism.36 What is more, the involvement of 
particular states in such minilateralist arrangements may have considerable implications on 
their effectiveness, given the importance of such states when it comes to their GHG emissions 
and/or geo-economic and geo-political clout. For instance, the impact of the US withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration has been assessed as negative for 
multilateralism, given that the US had not merely gone from being leader to follower, but to 
actually becoming an outsider, thus undermining the extent of Paris Agreement abatement 
efforts.37 It is worth noting that the US is the second largest emitter in absolute terms and was 
the twelfth in terms of emissions per capita in 2017,38 and, therefore, its absence has 
implications globally. The Biden administration, however, by signaling on January 21, 2021 
its acceptance of the Paris Agreement, has sought to reverse this situation, thus bringing the 
US back into the fold.39  
 
It is also worth noting that the US has had an ambivalent approach towards 
multilateralist climate mitigation as this remains a controversial policy field at the domestic 
level. Historically, the US has consistently been reluctant to assume binding obligations where 
no such/analogous obligations are also assumed by parties with less developed economies, as 
had been the case under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which categorized parties into 
different groupings burdened by different obligations. Against that backdrop, US reticence and 
vacillation may well reappear in future, unless some monumental cultural shift takes place in 
the US to definitively catalyze public opinion in favor of multilateralism. That being said, the 
 
arrangements need not be taken as “replacements to the UN approach but as friendly competitors and 
complements”.  
36 F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt, and F. Zelli (2009) The Fragmentation of Global Governance 
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis, Global Environmental Politics 9:4 and Victor (2015) The Case for 
Climate Clubs. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and 
World Economic Forum, 2015.  
37 D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, A. Underdal & J. Hovi (2018) The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump, 
Climate Policy, 18:7, 828.  
38 US total annual CO2 emissions stand at c. 5.28 billion MtCO2 (2019), annual emissions per capita stand at c. 
16.16 MtCO2 (2017). US total annual emissions represented c. 14.72% of global CO2 emissions (2017), while 
US historical, cumulative CO2 emissions stand at 410.24 billion MtCO2 (up to 2019). For comparison, China’s 
total annual CO2 emissions stand at c. 10.17 billion MtCO2 (2019); annual emissions per capita at c. 6.76 MtCO2 
(2017). China’s total CO2 emissions for 2017 represented 27.32% of global CO2 emissions. China’s historical, 
cumulative CO2 emissions stand at c. 219.99 billion MtCO2 (up to 2019). In terms of their respective share of 
global cumulative CO2 emissions, the US share stands at 24.82% while China’s at 13.31%. Based on 2017 figures, 
the US was the twelfth in terms of per capita emissions. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Australia, 
Kazakhstan, Brunei, and Trinidad & Tobago, among others, actually preceded it. The above figures have been 
drawn from charts developed by Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/united-
states?country=USA~CHN and https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions) and the World Resources Institute 
(https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/02/greenhouse-gas-emissions-by-country-sector), which, in turn, rely on a 
variety of datasets cited in their respective sources.  
39 White House: Briefing Room (2021, January 20) Paris Climate Agreement [Statement] 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/. What is 
more, President Biden has alluded to his vision for the US to play a more leading role in climate diplomacy by 
stating that, “On day one, I signed the paperwork to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement.  We’re taking steps led 
by the example of integrating climate objectives across all of our diplomacy and raise the ambition of our climate 
targets.  That way, we can challenge other nations, other major emitters … to up the ante on their own 
commitments.  I’ll be hosting climate leaders — a climate leaders’ summit to address the climate crisis on Earth 
Day of this year.  America must lead in the face of this existential threat.  And just as with the pandemic, it requires 
global cooperation.” See White House: Briefing Room (2021, February 4) Remarks by President Biden on 
America’s Place in the World [Speeches and Remarks] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/  
Leal-Arcas & Filis  International cooperation on climate change 
 
 11 
US has been involved in successful minilateralism when it comes to its geopolitical rival: 
China.  
 
For instance, in 2013 China and the US agreed to bilaterally phase down a group of the 
most harmful pollutants, namely hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and, furthermore, to provide 
global leadership to that end;40 an event that has been heralded as indicative of their “potential 
willingness to accede to an internationally binding climate change agreement which in turn 
may cause a watershed in negotiations and spur further action”.41 Interestingly, such bilateral 
cooperation took place in the midst of antagonisms on various fronts, including in connection 
to currency and trade disputes. This fact contradicts the notion that successful inter-state 
collaboration is predicated on cordial relations.42 That being said, while the participation of the 
US is not crucial for the formation or eventual success of minilateralist solutions, such clubs 
are less likely to extend over more than 50% of global emissions and to thus secure substantial 
cuts.43  
 
As mentioned earlier, the implications of minilateralist solutions for multilateralism 
should not be ignored. Such implications are neither always apparent nor uniform, given the 
variety of minilateralist initiatives at play. Sprinz et al. conclude that climate clubs, however, 
need not necessarily be antagonistic to multilateralism. While such minilateralism can provide 
alternatives to unsuccessful multilateralism – e.g. the Paris Agreement regime, should it fail to 
ensure that global efforts are on track to meet global objectives – they may actually be 
complimentary.44  
 
1. Climate Club Minilateralism  
 
The relevant literature contains much support for minilateralist approaches to climate 
governance, including for the purposes of surmounting existing consensus-based hurdles at the 
multilateral level. However, minilateralist solutions are not always successful and may actually 
undermine multilateralist efforts. For instance, a club of sorts, the erstwhile Asia-Pacific 
 
40 White House: Office of the Press Secretary (2013, June 8) United States and China Agree to Work Together on 
Phasing Down of HFCs [Press Release] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/08/united-states-and-china-agree-work-together-phase-down-hfcs, where it is stated, among other 
things, that, “President Obama and President Xi agreed on an important new step to confront global climate 
change. For the first time, the United States and China will work together and with other countries to use the 
expertise and institutions of the Montreal Protocol to phase down the consumption and production of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), among other forms of multilateral cooperation. A global phase down of HFCs could 
potentially reduce some 90 gigatons of CO2 equivalent by 2050, equal to roughly two years’ worth of current 
global greenhouse gas emissions.” 
41 M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic 
Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373 (2014), 375.  
42 In fact, Dellinger (ibid, 391) offers examples of how treaty creation and collaboration may take place even at 
the height of antagonisms. For instance, the height of the Cold War did not prevent the erstwhile Soviet Union to 
negotiate and conclude an agreement on the governance of Antarctica with, among other states, its archenemy at 
the time, the US. 
43 Sprinz, Sælen, Underdal, and Hovi have assessed the implications of US participation and absence from climate 
club initiatives, and their analysis indicates that the likely impact would depend on the US’s initial role in such 
initiatives. E.g. whether it had initiated/led, had been a follower, or had never participated. For the purposes of 
the present chapter, it would suffice to state that, predictably, climate club initiatives involving the most significant 
states in terms of emissions and/or geopolitical clout are likely to be the most impactful when it comes to climate 
mitigation. See D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, A. Underdal & J. Hovi (2018) The effectiveness of climate clubs under 
Donald Trump, Climate Policy, 18:7, 835-836.  
44 D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, A. Underdal & J. Hovi (2018) The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump, 
Climate Policy, 18:7, 836.  
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Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change45 (APP), to name but one example, 
sought to pursue voluntary climate mitigation objectives outside the UNFCCC, despite the 
express claim that it was to complement the Kyoto Protocol regime,46 but was unable to secure 
emissions reductions beyond what could probably have otherwise been achieved collectively 
under binding targets within the multilateralist system.47 The 2009 Major Economies Forum 
on Energy and Climate48 (MEF) and the 2012 Climate and Clean Air Coalition49 are other 
examples of minilateralist arrangements in that regard.50  
 
Furthermore, it is crucial to analyze each minilateralist solution separately in assessing 
their particular content – particularly the nature, level, and bindingness of abatement 
ambition/targets – to assess whether they are in line with global climate mitigation objectives. 
As Shuting Pomerleau highlights, minilateralist solutions are not a ‘silver bullet’ for a variety 
of reasons, including the potential implications of measures for consumers in climate club 
member states.51  
 
45 The APP was established in July 2005 between Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the US (with 
New Zealand and Canada joining later) to pursue voluntary climate mitigation objectives. The APP sought, among 
other things, to promote the take-up and use of energy efficient and cleaner technologies particularly on the part 
of less developed countries (India and China) on their path to industrialization and development. The APP adopted 
its Charter in Sydney in January 2006 and lasted until 2011, although various APP-related projects remain in 
operation. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090920021825/http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/charter.pdf  
46 See APP Charter (ibid) recitals where it is stated that, “Bearing in mind that the purposes of the Partnership are 
consistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other relevant 
international instruments, and are intended to complement but not replace the Kyoto Protocol….”. See also APP 
Charter Annex I Vision Statement of Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States 
of America for a new Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate of 28 July 2005 where it is 
stated that the APP “will be consistent with and contribute to our efforts under the UNFCCC and will complement, 
but not replace, the Kyoto Protocol”.  
47 See J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen & A. Underdal (2017) The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate 
Co-operation? B. J. Pol. S 49 1071-1096 (1091) who also suggest that club-like arrangements have been ‘no more 
effective’ than the UNFCCC in mitigating climate change given that they neither provide exclusive member 
benefits nor make conditional emissions reduction commitments (1091).  
48 Current MEF members: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union (EU) sui juris, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation (Russia), South Africa, the United 
Kingdom (the UK), and the US. President Obama announced the launch of the MEF on March 28, 2009 to 
facilitate ‘candid’ dialogue between the major developed and developing economies over clean energy and 
emission reduction/decarbonization objectives in light of the December 2009 UNFCCC Conference of Parties in 
Copenhagen. Denmark, in its capacity as President of the December 2009 Conference of the Parties, and the 
United Nations were also invited to participate. U.S. Department of State (2009) Major Economies Forum on 
Energy and Climate Change [Press Release] https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/climate/mem/index.htm.   
49 The Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, launched in 2012 by the UNEP, 
is a voluntary partnership of governments, intergovernmental organizations, businesses, scientific institutions, and 
civil society organizations aimed at improving air quality and environmental protection through actions to reduce 
short-lived pollutants. https://ccacoalition.org/en/content/about-0.  
50 D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, A. Underdal & J. Hovi (2018) The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump, 
Climate Policy, 18:7, 830 
51 Shuting Pomerleau (Niskanen Center) argues that Nobelist William Nordhaus’s alternative proposals hinge on 
the imposition of global carbon price and uniform import tariffs on non-members as a means to address free riding 
which may actually hurt consumers in implementing members than those outside the bloc. Other difficulties 
include reaching consensus on carbon price and social costs and so on which is hard enough domestically. 
Nordhaus’s proposal is not for a border carbon adjustment (BCA) contingent on emission content of goods but a 
uniform tariff on all imports from non-member states. Something along the lines of US$25 per MtCO2 and a 3% 
ad valorem tariff would provide strong incentive for non-members. Also, a uniform tariff imposed on non-
members does not discriminate in favor of low-carbon imports, which is absurd and potentially counterproductive. 
This could also be said about the imposition of retaliatory measures by non-members. Solutions may exist in 
leveraging or amending current World Trade Organization (WTO) rules but this may be unfeasible given the 




One such assessment is provided by Weischer, Morgan, and Patel (2012), who examine 
17 clubs founded between 1974 and 2012 that, either exclusively or partially, concern climate 
mitigation, and found that such arrangements generally fall within two categories: dialogue 
forums or implementation groups.52 The former concern the type of club where parties 
exchange information and gain a better understanding of their respective positions, whereas the 
latter collectively implement agreed policies. Examples of the former include the G8, G20, 
MEF, the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), and the Global 
Bioenergy Partnership, while examples of the latter include the Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) and the Global Green Growth Institute. However, their 
analysis concludes that, while the clubs examined make ‘important contributions’ – e.g. they 
facilitate a better mutual understanding of the respective positions and interests of parties, 
facilitate the sharing of best practice, and help coordinate mitigation action – they are neither 
focused on significantly increased ambition53 nor dramatically reduce GHG emissions at the 
scale and speed required to meet global mitigation targets (i.e. to ensure that average global 
temperatures do not exceed 2°C by the end of the century).54  
 
In response to what would make a climate club ‘transformational’ and consistent with 
the 2°C target, the World Resource Institute (WRI) has arrived at the following four criteria: 
 
1. ambitious vision;  
2. clear membership conditions;  
3. considerable member benefits; and  
4. a clear pathway from immediate action to expansion (i.e. increase in ambition 
and potentially membership) over time.  
 
More specifically, vision must be in line with climate science, and may relate to targets 
concerning emissions reductions, energy efficiency, renewable energy (RE) deployment, or 
price parity for RE technology. According to the WRI, ambition must reflect what is necessary 
to solve the problem.  
 
Membership should be exclusive and only granted to parties that meet clear criteria that 
are consistent with the vision. Such conditions may be predicated on the track records, current 
or future targets, or other indicators of current and future commitment/action. Such criteria 
 
complexities involved (e.g. unanimity of members to amend key norms).  What is more, commenting on 
Nordhaus’s Climate Club proposals, Pomerleau states that “…a climate club might not be a silver bullet to global 
climate-mitigation efforts. While the proposal is ambitious and backed by detailed modeling, it’s not without its 
own challenges. Nordhaus admitted that ‘the international community is a long way from adopting a Climate Club 
or a similar arrangement to slow the ominous march of climate change.’ No country can solve climate change on 
its own. An effective and accountable international collaboration mechanism is overdue.” See S. Pomerleau (2020, 
September 21), Potential Challenges to a Climate Club. Niskanen Center. 
https://www.niskanencentre.org/potential-challenges-to-a-climate-club/.  
52 L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big 
Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 21 (3). The membership of the clubs examined ranged from 
7 (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which came to a close in 2011) to 73 (the 
REDD+). Most related to energy issues and were independent of the UNFCCC but a minority were connected to 
the implementation of UNFCCC COP decisions.  
53 Ibid. 192.  
54 Ibid. 187, and J. Morgan and L. Weischer (2012, October 29). Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of 
Countries Can Make A Big Difference on Climate Change (World Resources Institute). 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2012/10/two-degrees-clubs-how-small-groups-countries-can-make-big-difference-
climate-change.  
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must be specific and measurable, and also reflect the willingness of parties to move forward 
but also raise ambition in future.  
 
In terms of benefits, there must be strong incentives for joining so that prospective 
members will accept the ambitious conditions for membership. Therefore, the club has to create 
palpable member benefits in areas such as investment, technology sharing, and/or trade, which 
should not otherwise be available to those outside the club.  
 
In terms of a clear pathway to current and future action, the club would need,  
to become operational quickly, so it is likely to start with relatively easy-to-implement 
activities, such as information sharing. However, a two degrees club should be set up in a way 
that allows it to address more difficult questions (e.g., around trade), grow in scope (e.g., 
expanding from renewable energy or efficiency to other areas), and increase the number of 
members over time. What starts as a small energy transformation club could turn into a ‘low-
carbon union,’ providing significant benefits across all sectors of the low-carbon economy to a 
growing number of member countries.55  
 
A further review builds on existing analyses to find some merit in the pursuit of 
minilateralist solutions and to offer recommendations to that end. Hovi et al. suggest that 
starting small, namely with a small group of ‘enthusiastic’ states to then seek to entice 
‘reluctant’ states may be ‘promising’ for the purposes of climate mitigation. However, most 
importantly, the potential synergistic effects of minilateralist instances on multilateralism 
(namely the UNFCCC regime) may hold some positive implications for global abatement 
efforts, although the potential of climate clubs for being instrumental in global climate 
mitigation is not readily apparent in the scholarly literature.56 
 
Falkner, in his analysis, concludes that minilateralism is unlikely to overcome structural 
barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international climate agreement. That being said, 
minilateralist initiatives such as climate clubs may, among other things, enhance political 
dialogue within the context of existing multilateral negotiations and, thus, facilitate ‘great 
power bargaining’,57 which, in itself, is a useful net gain, if no actual drawbacks to 
multilateralism are discernable.    
 
Other studies seek to prescribe the features of effective minilateralism. For instance, 
Nordhaus provides extensive analysis on the pitfalls and likely facilitators of effective 
minilateralism by examining no less than 44 regimes across 15 regions.58 Essentially, effective 
 
55 J. Morgan and L. Weischer (2012, October 29). Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of Countries Can Make 
A Big Difference on Climate Change (World Resources Institute). https://www.wri.org/blog/2012/10/two-
degrees-clubs-how-small-groups-countries-can-make-big-difference-climate-change. 
56 J. Hovi, D.F. Sprinz, H. Sælen, and A. Underdal (2016) Climate change mitigation: a role for climate clubs? 
Palgrave Communications. 2:16020  
57 R. Falkner (2015) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits and 
international legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change. Economics and Policy. Working Paper No. 222, London, 
UK. Having analyzed the relevant literature and particular examples of clubs, Falkner concludes that 
minilateralism offers “no panacea for the ills of climate multilateralism. Most critically, climate clubs cannot 
pressurize or induce reluctant great powers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. However, a realistic 
approach to climate minilateralism, focused on coalitions of the willing, holds the promise of moving us beyond 
the current stalemate in international climate negotiations. The rise of minilateralism … can be harnessed to 
strengthen an increasingly polycentric field of global governance. … can inject political momentum into 
gridlocked international processes, provide new forms of collective leadership in a post-hegemonic world and 
reconcile existing multilateral regimes with shifts in the global power balance.” (27).   
58 W. Nordhaus (2015) Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy. American 
Economic Review, 105(4): 1339-1370. 
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minilateralism seems to boil down to the presence of effective sticks and carrots to ensure the 
incremental increase in participation and ambition during the life of a club-like arrangement. 
 
As discussed in greater detail in other parts of the present publication, examples would 
be regimes that contain trade sanctions or other trade barriers (e.g. taxes including carbon taxes, 
import tariffs, and/or carbon allowance requirements) for non-participants of a sufficient level 
that cannot be ignored.59 For instance, when trade sanctions are lower than the abatement costs 
necessary under a climate club, there is no tangible incentive (setting aside the need to 
meaningfully address climate change and avert further environmental degradation) for a non-
participant state to join the club. In other words, if it costs less to abstain, states may choose to 
abstain. What is more, an effective climate club ought to contain consistent carbon pricing 
along with trade sanctions to induce substantial abatement. That said, Nordhaus suggests that 
the sustainability of such a regime is predicated on trade growth;60 therefore, there seems to be 
insufficient evidence based on the modeling on whether effective carbon pricing can be 
sustained where there is no growth, given the implications of carbon pricing externalities for 
trade growth.  
 
Following the analysis of minilateralist proposals and experiences, Weischer et al. also 
conclude on the sort of features that seem indispensable to optimal minilateralism, including 
the need for a shared vision and the offer of strong exclusive (primarily economic) incentives 
for members that are also compatible with existing international rules.61  
 
Hovi et al. also conclude that effective minilateralism relies on the existence of a variety 
of factors, including conditional commitments (that is to say, that membership is conditional), 
exclusive club goods (that is to say, membership benefits), support from at least one global 
power (e.g. the EU or the US, and less so from China, which is less likely to be as enthusiastic), 
and higher marginal returns from participation.62  
 
59 The appropriate level of a uniform ad valorem tariff on all imports from non-participants is not straightforward 
and would have to be conditional on other aspects of the climate club including its carbon pricing and particular 
membership. Nordhaus considers penalties for non-participants in the form of such tariffs varying from 0% to 
10%. It is suggested that a rate of at least 4% could induce states to join a club which involves high-income states 
(given the implications for their trade exports), while a higher rate of 5% or more could be conducive to a club 
coming closer to achieving its abatement gains. However, even a tariff of 2% could induce a coalition that comes 
close to optimal abatement levels so long as the target carbon price is c. US$50 per MtCO2. See W. Nordhaus 
(2014). Climate Clubs: Designing a Mechanism to Overcome Free-riding in International Climate Policy. 
Presidential Address to the American Economic Association (2014, January 4), (2, 24 & 29). This is also reflected 
in Nordhaus’s subsequent publication, see W. Nordhaus (2015) Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in 
International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, 105(4): 1339-1370 (1356).  
60 See W. Nordhaus (2014). Climate Clubs: Designing a Mechanism to Overcome Free-riding in International 
Climate Policy. Presidential Address to the American Economic Association (2014, January 4), where it is stated 
that, “Assuming that international trade rises at the same time as world output and its composition is unchanged… 
the optimal carbon price would need to rise by one-fifth relative to output and trade over the period to 2100…. If 
the policy were to keep within a 2°C upper temperature limit, the target would [be around] $50 per ton CO2…but 
it would grow more slowly than world GDP…. The modelling results indicate that modest trade penalties on non-
participants can induce a coalition that approaches the optimal level of abatement as long as the target carbon 
price is less than $50 per ton range. The regime is sustainable as long as world trade grows as fast as the optimal 
carbon price. Such a regime would have incentives favorable for attracting a large majority of countries.” 
(emphasis added) (32 & 33).  
61 L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big 
Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 21 (191, 192).  
62 See J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen & A. Underdal (2017) The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate 
Co-operation? B. J. Pol. S 49 1071-1096, where it is stated that, “First, the ‘right’ actors must be enthusiastic. In 
particular, the actors initiating the club must control a sufficiently large share of global emissions and income. 
The United States or the European Union (EU) (but not China) can under some conditions single-handedly initiate 




David Victor,63 overall, also supports minilateralism and argues that there ought to be 
greater openness on the part of skeptics within the UN climate diplomatic community towards 
such solutions, given the limitations of UNFCCC-type multilateralism. Victor also argues that 
club-like arrangements should make specific pledges to the UNFCCC process and allow 
external scrutiny, both for the purposes of allaying fears concerning inter-regime antagonisms 
but to also encourage the sharing of best practice.64 Moreover, Victor identifies two types of 
club member that effective clubs ought to draw in, given that their cooperation is likely to yield 
the greatest gains. On the one hand, there are those that are net contributors to global public 
goods by means of their considerable abatement efforts or targets (e.g. the EU, Norway, 
Sweden, and even the US), while, on the other, there is the type of club members that are 
reluctant ‘laggards’ when it comes to assuming specific binding targets comparable to those of 
other members, and to allowing outside scrutiny (e.g. China).65  
 
Among others, Brewer et al. have carried out a review of existing club-like 
arrangements, albeit in connection to carbon markets, to examine whether membership size is 
a determinant of success and whether club-like benefits can incentivize participation and 
compliance. 66 Among their findings is the notion that, while some climate clubs, when 
compared to multilateral organizations, may facilitate agreement, conditions on participation 
and compliance can still prevent participation and consensus-building. In that sense, the sort of 
hurdles inherent to multilateralism may also be present in minilateralist solutions. As a starting 
point for potential participants to consider in designing a club arrangement, Brewer et al. refer 
to a number of issues that club rules may need to establish, including commitments to 
comparable targets, consistency across the membership (e.g. common definition of units, 
allowances, offsets etc.), the agreed scope of coverage, converging emissions-verification 
checks, compliance assurance, and a shared registry (or network of registries).67 
 
Martin et al. list factors in assessing whether the top 15 global emitters are likely to 
participate in minilateralist arrangements, including their respective carbon dependence, 
domestic public opinion on climate change, official policy position, and involvement in climate 
coalitions. 68 They devise a ‘net likelihood’ taxonomy that places each of the emitters under 
review in either the ‘likely’ grouping or the ‘not likely’. The former includes the EU as a bloc, 
three EU member states (France, Germany, and Italy), the UK, Canada, and Japan – which so 
far, represent six of the G7 members – along with Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea, 
while the latter grouping includes China and the US, along with India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.69  
 
 
a club that can persist and attract other members. If both were enthusiastic, the prospects for at least moderate 
club success would appear bright, because in our model the United States and the EU can in many cases entice 
China to join by appealing to its self-interest.” (emphasis added) (1073).  
63 D. Victor (2015) The Case for Climate Clubs. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015 (8).  
64 Ibid. 5 & 6.  
65 Ibid. 9.  
66 T. L. Brewer, H. Derwent, A. Błachowicz & M. Grubb (2016) Carbon Market Clubs and the New Paris 
Regime. Networked Carbon Markets. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25768  
67 Ibid. 31.  
68 N. Martin and J. C. J. M. van den Bergh (2019) A multi-level climate club with national and sub-national 
members: theory and application to US states. Environ. Res. Lett. 14 124049  
69 Ibid. 4.  
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2. Climate Club formation 
 
While, undoubtedly, the formation of clubs – at the very least, coalitions of the willing – neither 
precludes nor, on the face of it, undermines concurrent or subsequent multilateralism, without 
the participation of the greatest culprits (i.e. highest GHG emitters), it simply cannot achieve 
the critical mass necessary to prevent temperature increases above prescribed objectives (i.e. 
1.5-2C by 2100 relative to pre-industrial temperature levels). The UNEP considers that the 
current emissions gap can be bridged, but that ‘unprecedented and immediate action’ is 
necessary.70 What this means is that the situation is so pressing that, at the very minimum, the 
top ten emitters must take serious abatement action in order to close the gap in time to avert 
potentially catastrophic knock-on effects to the climate. In that sense, there is no room for 
complacency and prevarication. 
 
The science is settled. However, moral implorations and appeals to reason are clearly 
not enough as they have yet to yield significant abatement within the existing multilateralist 
setting. That being said, loci of minilateralism (even when they lack the highest emitters) could 
well serve as the nuclei upon which other states progressively latch, so long as effective 
incentives and penalties are present to incrementally lead to climate clubs of consequence when 
it comes to meeting global abatement goals. In fact, these are views supported by commentators 
who consider it useful to build clubs around enthusiastic and powerful states willing and able 
to contribute meaningfully.71 Particularly fruitful would be concerted, meaningful action in 
relation to renewable energy storage, solar and wind energy, energy efficiency in appliances 
and passenger transport, afforestation, and halting deforestation.72 However, the underlying 
assumption here is that, 
countries will act quickly and implement the most cost-effective measures in their national 
contexts [which] is evidently a very idealistic assumption, but it underlines the fact that the 
policies and technologies needed to bridge the gap are readily available and at limited costs.73 
 
Furthermore, the viewpoint that all major emitters are needed for a climate club has been 
challenged by various commentators. Dillinger does not consider this essential and proposes a 
range or narrower constellations even arguing that as few as two parties could kickstart a new 
climate club: the obvious ideal being that of a China-US climate club. A bilateral precedent 
pertains to how initially intractable Japan-US negotiations on telecommunications actually 
resulted in the multilateralization of this policy area and the advent of the International 
Telecommunication Union. Another example of starting small is the current EU that had 
initially involved two (namely France and Germany), then six states with agreements on steel 
and coal, to then transform into the current global juggernaut presently comprising 27 member 
states.  Other examples involve the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed by 
 
70 Christensen, J. and Olhoff, A. (2019). Lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments. United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi (6). 
71 J. Hovi, D. F. Sprinz, H. Sælen & A. Underdal (2017) The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate 
Co-operation? B. J. Pol. S 49, 1091, and D. Victor (2015) The Case for Climate Clubs. E15 Initiative. Geneva: 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015 (3, 4, 
& 12).  
72 See Christensen, J. and Olhoff, A. (2019). Lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments. United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi. According to that report, these areas “present a combined potential of up to 21 
GtCO2e per year by 2030, which is more than sufficient to get on a pathway to well below 2C.” (emphasis 
added). In fact, total emissions reduction could be as high as 38 GtCO2e per year (within an uncertainty range of 
35-41 GtCO2e) per year (6).  
73 Ibid. 6.  
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23 parties and how it resulted in the current World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral 
trade order currently extending over 164 parties.74   
 
Unsurprisingly, club efficiency is inescapably predicated on the quality and quantity of 
prospective members and their agreed abatement targets. While the most immediate thought 
may be on how to co-opt many, if not all, of the largest emitters, it may be more instructive to 
focus on co-opting a mixture of states that, among themselves, have much else to offer, 
including abatement capability, financing, geo-economic clout, and leadership. Some have 
argued that it may be fruitful to start with a small group of leadership states. While this alone 
is unlikely to reduce the current global emissions gap, what it may achieve, among other things, 
is to facilitate technological development and transfer, ‘provide momentum’, and become 
‘transformational’ by providing ‘proof-of-concept’ for non-participants to emulate. Evidently, 
this would be contingent on the necessary political will on the part of climate leaders being 
forthcoming.75  
 
For instance, a trilateral arrangement between China, the EU, and the US would 
obviously be ideal, given the fact that it involves the top three GHG emitters in absolute terms,76 
but also involves states representing the most responsible, the most capable, and the lesser 
developed. Dellinger further concludes that the ‘magic number’ could be as little as three, 
The “magic number”—to recall, “the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the 
largest possible impact on solving a particular problem” or at least instigating crucial action 
towards a resolution—is, in the climate change context, three: the United States, the European 
Union, and China. This constellation would account for 49% of the world’s total GHG 
emissions. And with Brazil as an increasingly likely fourth player, 52% of global GHGs would 
be accounted for. Scientifically, this is arguably not a high enough percentage to solve the 
ultimate problem, but … broader multilateral action can be derived progressively from 
narrower beginnings, so even a coalition of “just” three or four initial parties may be enough. 
So far, the international community has gained literally nothing from attempting the broadest 
possible solution; near-global treaty participation.77  
 
As briefly mentioned earlier, given the Biden administration’s re-accession to the Paris 
Agreement and US presidential statements expressing intention to provide climate leadership, 
coupled with EU enthusiasm to provide leadership and to further explore climate cooperation 
with China, such a prospect seems increasingly less chimeric. As the third highest emitter (and 
second highest GDP), the EU is evidently among the most appealing contenders for optimal 
climate club formation. What is more, it falls within the ‘likely’ grouping under the Martin et 
al. taxonomy of prospective participants, mentioned earlier. Moreover, the EU currently 
pursues trade diplomacy with three other states that fall within the ‘likely’ grouping, namely 
Japan, Mexico, and South Korea, and with one state from the ‘not likely’ grouping, namely 
South Africa.78 Additionally, the EU has a long history of being a climate leader with its 
 
74 M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic 
Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373 (2014) (401).  
75 J. Morgan and L. Weischer (2012, October 29). Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of Countries Can Make 
A Big Difference on Climate Change (World Resources Institute). 
76 See interactive chart at the World Resources Institute website using 2018 figures 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top-emitters.  
77 See M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic 
Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373 (2014) (438).  
78 N. Martin and J. C. J. M. van den Bergh (2019) A multi-level climate club with national and sub-national 
members: theory and application to US states. Environ. Res. Lett. 14 124049 (4).  
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ambitious (yet perhaps unrealistic, given the political and institutional realities)79 targets. In 
that sense, it has the capacity to provide strong leadership globally, but also within an effective 
minilateralist climate club arrangement.  
 
Other club-like arrangements could involve states such as India, Russia, Japan, South 
Korea, and Brazil, which could provide the right mix between capability, responsibility, and 
need/vulnerability when it comes to the configuration of members.80 
 
Furthermore, discussion around climate clubs is not limited to national actors, and does 
extend to sub-national, but also sectoral, with the obvious examples being the energy-intensive 
trade-exposed (EITE) sectors (including steel, aluminum, and concrete)81 and other sectors 
(fashion, international maritime, and aviation).  
 
In conclusion, arriving at the ‘right’ configuration of participants to club-like climate 
arrangements is far from straightforward. Enticing the most polluting has not worked within 
multilateralist settings due to political and other pitfalls. Those are not necessarily absent in 
smaller settings. Nor is there a certain path to success. As Nordhaus puts it, 
An important question is, how would … a Climate Club get started? Who would define the 
regime? Would it begin with a grand Bretton-Woods-type conference? Or would it evolve from 
a small number of countries who see the logic, define a regime, and then invite other countries 
to join?  
 
There are no clear answers to these questions. International organizations evolve in 
unpredictable ways. Sometimes, it takes repeated failures before a successful model is 
developed. The histories of the gold and dollar standards, cholera conventions, the WTO, the 
European Union, and the Internet all emphasize the unpredictability in the development of 
international regimes…. The destination of a Climate Club is clear, but there are many roads 
that will get there (emphasis added).82  
 
3. Climate Clubs and the UNFCCC (Minilateralism vis-à-vis Multilateralism) 
 
It should be noted from the outset that the UNFCCC contains provisions (cf. Articles 4(2) & 
12) that expressly recognize the right of parties to come together to pursue particular policies 
and measures that contribute to the objectives of the UNFCCC. Moreover, provisions within 
the Paris Agreement reflect this openness towards minilateralist cooperation in recognizing 
that parties may choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in pursuit of their intended nationally 
 
79 J. Pisani-Ferry, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a senior fellow at the 
Brussels-based Bruegel think tank, in his Memorandum to the President of the European Commission on Concrete 
Initiatives for a More Outward-Looking, Geopolitical Europe, lauding aspects of President von der Leyen’s State 
of the Union 2020 Address, highlights how the EU, in its present form, is ‘not wired’ for the EU’s climate agenda 
given its institutional limitations – after all, it remains a rules-based institution chiefly inward-looking with regard 
to its politics and its need to reach and sustain agreements between a disparate set of member states. See J. Pisani-
Ferry (2020, December 2) Memo to the European Commission on concrete initiatives for a more outward-looking, 
geopolitical Europe (PIIE). https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/memo-european-
commission-concrete-initiatives-more-outward.  
80 Such configurations are explored at length by Dellinger. See M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a 
Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham 
Int'l L.J. 373 (2014) (412-420, 435-438).  
81 Cement accounts for around 8% of global GHG emissions and steel for 7-9%. See The Economist, “Climate 
change and innovation: Greenbacks for greenery,” 31 October 2021, pp. 55-57, at 57. The fashion industry is 
responsible for around 15% of global GHG emissions, whereas aviation around 5% and shipping 3-5%. 
82 W. Nordhaus (2015) Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy. American 
Economic Review, 105(4): 1339-1370, (1351-1352).  
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determined contributions (INDCs) to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation efforts, but 
to also allow for reaching economies of effort (cf. Article 6).83 In that sense, minilateralist 
arrangements are, on the face of it, compatible with the UNFCCC. However, this is not to say 
that such arrangements necessarily have positive implications for UNFCCC multilateralism.  
 
It is crucial, therefore, to analyze each minilateralist initiative on its own merits to 
discern its likely impact on multilateralism. To that end, Biermann et al. have systematically 
analyzed examples of minilateralist climate mitigation initiatives, but also conducted a 
systematic review of the relevant literature, to assess implications for global climate 
governance (and its cohesion) and how this issue is examined in the literature.84 They conclude 
that minilateralist initiatives may be initially assessed to establish whether they contribute to 
fragmentation in global climate governance.85 Subsequently, those found to contribute to 
fragmentation may then be further categorized according to their ‘degree of fragmentation,’ 
i.e., on whether, overall, they have synergistic, cooperative, or conflictive fragmentative effects 
on global climate governance,86 with the first two evidently being the least harmful.  
 
Biermann et al. conclude that, for the most part, global climate governance appears to 
exhibit cooperative fragmentation, with its institutional hub/core being the UNFCCC, which 
lays down the foundations for multilateralist governance, while also recognizing that states 
parties with disparate realities (e.g. emissions history, development level, means, capabilities, 
and so on) may have common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CDR-RC), thus acknowledging that global objectives may have to also rely on minilateralist 
solutions.  
 
83 See The Economic Potential of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and Implementation Challenges (2019) IETA, 
University of Maryland and CPLC. Washington, D.C. (15) which extensively analyzes the scope of Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement for parties to work together to either lower the costs of achieving their pledges or to increase 
their ambition. Since parties have different abatement capabilities and global emissions shares, emissions trading 
under Article 6 may be necessary to incentivize parties with excess abatement capacity to become net-negative 
emitters to ‘compensate’ for other parties unable currently to reach carbon neutrality. Also see World Bank. State 
and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2020 (May), World Bank, Washington, DC (49) and UNFCCC, Draft CMA 
Decision on the Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of 
the Paris Agreement, December 15, 2019, for further detail.  
84 F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt, and F. Zelli (2009) The Fragmentation of Global Governance 
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis, Global Environmental Politics 9:4 (14 & 15).  
85 Ibid. 19, where it is stated that “[I]n global environmental politics more than 700 multilateral agreements are in 
force. Most have evolved independently, cover different geographic and substantial scopes, and are marked by 
different patterns of codification, institutionalization, and cohesion. A decade ago, in response to this 
fragmentation, a United Nations task force recommended stronger cooperation between multilateral 
environmental institutions to facilitate synergies and promote policy coherence. This fragmentation has also been 
at issue in numerous policy proposals that call for the clustering and integration of environmental institutions, 
notably through establishment of a world environment organization, to create a less fragmented architecture in 
this field. While some observers support a world environment organization to tackle fragmentation in global 
environmental governance, others oppose the idea of ‘organizational tinkering’ and emphasize the benefits of a 
more fragmented architecture.” Ibid. 19.  
86 Ibid. 20-22. According to Biermann et al. an example of synergistic fragmentation would be the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna, 22 March 1985) and its Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987) plus their subsequent amendments. An 
example of cooperative fragmentation would be in relation to a common issue but were there are different 
institutions e.g. the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. An example of conflictive fragmentation would be where 
regimes are hardly connected and have conflicting sets of underlying objectives and principles e.g. the 1995 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) (within the context of the World Trade 
Organization – NB. TRIPS is a ‘covered’ WTO agreement binding on all WTO parties) and how aspects of it may 
interact with the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (broadly within the context of the United 
Nations (UN)) in relation to how, among other things, genetic resources are fairly and equitably exploited.  




For instance, the Kyoto Protocol within the context of the UNFCCC provided for 
differentiation of obligations depending on the level of development of states, but also 
contained features (e.g. mechanisms such as emissions trading, funding arrangements, and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)) that go beyond the UNFCCC and do not apply to all 
its parties (e.g. the US is party to the UNFCCC, but not the Protocol, and this has fragmentative 
implications). The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), while in line with the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol, is systemically independent of those regimes and has clear collaborative 
effects vis-à-vis UNFCCC multilateralism. In that sense, fragmentation in global climate 
governance may provide abatement solutions not currently attainable within the existing 
multilateralist setting by facilitating the inclusion of more relevant actors and sectors than may 
be possible through a more ‘integrated but static architecture’. Case in point is, for instance, 
how the Kyoto Protocol (or the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, for that matter) had not 
required emissions reductions from, among others, international aviation, yet the EU bloc, 
through the EU ETS, sought to cover this sector.87  
 
However, other instances may have had more harmful implications. For instance, 
Weischer et al. consider that minilateralist initiatives such as climate clubs or coalitions were 
originally formed to compete with the UNFCCC, but that nowadays, for their most part, they 
complement the latter.88 Moreover, Biermann et al. consider the now-defunct APP to be a 
departure from key UNFCCC regime features, including the differentiation between 
industrialized and developing states. Even though not comparable to the UNFCCC regime, 
they consider that the APP,  
still provide[d] an alternative to international climate action that may reduce incentives for 
complying with, or signing up to, international legally binding commitments…. Importantly, 
these instances of fragmentation in climate governance [were] intentional.” The Asia-Pacific 
Partnership and similar proposals – backed by the United States – were created not out of 
ignorance of the climate regime but because of it, at a time when the climate convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol were well established and in force.89     
 
 This also chimes with the views of other commentators. Bäckstrand et al. have also 
suggested that the APP and other minilateralist initiatives had actually been designed as 
‘alternative models or rival forums’ to the UNFCCC. That being said, they find that successive 
waves of minilateralism have led to most of this initial inter-club ‘rivalry to have vanished’, 
though they state it is too early to assume that this trend is irreversible. 90 Such fragmentation 
need not be conflictive, however, were an important actor such as the US to seek to form some 
minilateralist, even bilateral, arrangement with, say, an equally important actor such as China, 
where the abatement etc. ambitions are substantially above what may currently be achieved 
multilaterally within the UNFCCC context.91  
 
87 Ibid. 28 & 29. Biermann et al. also state that a fragmented architecture “might offer solutions that are specifically 
tailored for specific regions and thus increase equity by better accounting for special circumstances…. Yet again, 
serious problems may outweigh benefits. First, conflictive fragmentation, where different actors pull in different 
directions, may complicate linkages with other policy areas”. 
88 L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big 
Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 21 (191). 
89 F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt, and F. Zelli (2009) The Fragmentation of Global Governance 
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis, Global Environmental Politics 9:4 (22-24).  
90 K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action (338-356). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (350).  
91 F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt, and F. Zelli (2009) The Fragmentation of Global Governance 
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis, Global Environmental Politics 9:4 (26 & 27).  




As Morgan and Weischer argue, an effective ‘transformational’ climate club along the 
lines they envisage need not aim to replace the UNFCCC regime, which, after all, remains the 
one platform where global ambition and other key considerations, including equity, can keep 
being discussed and negotiated. In that sense, climate clubs could complement the UNFCCC 
regime, as they would enable their respective memberships to assume more ambitious 
commitments than they would alone, and pull other countries with them. Furthermore, how 
efforts are coordinated between the UNFCCC and minilateralist arrangements such as climate 
clubs should not be neglected, not least to ensure that information and best practice sharing 
remain effective.92 Furthermore, Falkner lauds Eckersley’s climate club proposed model as the 
‘most fully developed’ in relation to formalizing links to the UNFCCC regime.93 Other 
examples include the Non-state Actor for Climate Action (NAZCA), which is a platform of 
several minilateral arrangements over which the UNFCCC Secretariat has the possibility to 
keep track.94 
 
Other analyses of global climate governance conclude that it is characterized by 
polycentrism, where there is an identifiable epicenter, namely the UNFCCC that provides the 
overarching normative and governance context, but where there are other loci of climate 
governance including public and private actors in relation to, among other things, market 
involvement (e.g. emissions trading, finance, etc.) and the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM.95 In that 
sense, again, minilateralist solutions involving institutional fragmentation may also involve 
interdependence among actors and could be seen as actually advancing UNFCCC 
multilateralist goals. Bäckstrand et al., also view that the multilateralist UNFCCC, through the 
subsequent Paris Agreement, institutionalized ‘hybrid multilateralism,’ where one witnesses 
an intensified interplay between multilateral and minilateral/transnational climate cooperation, 
whereby the UNFCCC Secretariat plays a coordinating role.96  
 
 
92 See J. Morgan and L. Weischer (2012, October 29). Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups of Countries Can 
Make A Big Difference on Climate Change (World Resources Institute), where it is stated that “Defining the 
relationship of such clubs to the UNFCCC could become an important issue in the ongoing negotiations – the 
clubs could formally or informally report to the UNFCCC. Going further, the actions of the club members could 
also be negotiated, recognized, and monitored within the UNFCCC.” Also see L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. 
Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate 
Change? RECIEL 21 (3), where the authors state that UNFCCC multilateralism should not be replaced given that 
“climate change is caused by the cumulative effects of all global emissions, all major emitters need to be brought 
into an agreement to avoid free rider problems that would undermine the effectiveness of any solution. 
Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are affecting all countries, especially the poorest and most vulnerable, 
so they need to have a voice in the decision-making process to ensure an ambitious outcome that will be accepted 
as legitimate.” (178).   
93 See R. Falkner (2015) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits 
and international legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change. Economics and Policy. Working Paper No. 222 (20) 
and  R. Eckersley, (2012) Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism? Global 
Environmental Politics 12(2): 24-42 (33).  
94 K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (351).  
95 K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action (338-356). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
96 Ibid (345), where the authors state that, “the UNFCCC Secretariat tak[es] a role as facilitator or orchestrator of 
transnational climate action…. The Lima-Paris Action Agenda (which later morphed into the Marrakech 
Partnership for Global Climate Action) and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) were launched 
to galvanize the groundswell of actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, 
businesses and civil society organizations”.  
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Lastly, empirical insights suggest that minilateral approaches attract less support among 
the general public and the climate diplomatic community when compared to UNFCCC 
multilateralism, particularly when climate clubs fail to cover large shares of global emissions. 
That being said, support increases when other club-design factors such as differentiation in 
commitment levels, membership benefits/club goods, and sanctions for non-members are 
present.97 
 
4. Legitimacy and Accountability  
 
Questions of legitimacy and accountability often arise in relation to global climate governance, 
including minilateralist initiatives and polycentrism.98 For instance, the UNFCCC regime is 
predicated, for the most part, on the voluntarist nature of international law. Parties voluntarily 
accede to it and assume the (general) international obligations under that treaty. It is then open 
to them to consent to the imposition of subsequent international obligations. In that sense, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat enjoys legitimacy and is accountable to the parties of the UNFCCC. This 
is a view also reflected empirically.99 This could also be said for minilateralist initiatives such 
as climate clubs comprising states as members, but this is less so with transnational climate 
clubs that, in addition, comprise non-state actors such as industry/sectoral representatives and 
so on. Therefore, the implications such initiatives may have for UNFCCC multilateralism 
should also be examined in relation to how they actually interplay with the latter and, more 
specifically, whether and to what extent they provide scope for UNFCCC scrutiny.100  
 
What is more, Bäckstrand et al. highlight how legitimacy may be intricately connected 
to questions of representation, and that climate minilateralism has exhibited ‘considerable lack 
of inclusiveness’ of poorer states, such as small island states and least-developed economies, 
in relation to clubs such as those within the ‘global’ context (e.g. G7, G8, G20 etc.), but also 
from more technology-specific initiatives, thus failing to reflect a more balanced participation 
in relation to abatement capability and climate vulnerability.101 Furthermore, empirical 
evidence would suggest that  
 
97 R. Gampfer (2014) UNFCCC v. Minilateralism: Effects on agreement design features on support for global 
climate governance architectures, ETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies. Gampfer 
surveyed two constituencies: climate policymakers – namely, UNFCCC delegates – and the US general public.  
98 For a discussion on polycentrism and governance across complex human systems, see Nobel Laureate E. Ostrom 
(December 8, 2009) Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Nobel 
Lecture), among other writings by Ostrom.  
99 See R. Gampfer (2014) UNFCCC v. Minilateralism: Effects on agreement design features on support for global 
climate governance architectures, ETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies (3) where survey 
conclusions include the notion that climate clubs lack the sort of legal legitimacy that UNFCCC possesses given 
the role and symbolism of the UN when it comes to multilateral negotiations over global issues. 
100 See K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action (338-356). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, where it is stated “The problem of 
accountability at the transnational level is amplified in polycentric climate governance, where actors are both 
regulators and regulated, be it cities, intergovernmental agencies, carbon market actors or standard-setting 
organisations…. The range of accountability and legitimacy challenges is so varied in polycentric climate 
governance that the key task becomes one of analysing the dynamics and logics of legitimacy and accountability 
in each. Polycentricity includes governance arrangements requiring top-down, hierarchical accountability as well 
as horizontal, non-hierarchical (market, peer and reputational accountability).” (344).  
101 See K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action, where they state that, “Minilateral climate coalitions or clubs, that is initiatives 
predominantly governed by a limited number of governments, have multiplied since the mid- 2000s. Established 
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polycentric governance can equally be non-transparent and exclusive in providing closed 
venues for coalition building, trust and bargaining between powerful elites from government, 
market and civil society. This image is far from the normative ideal in polycentric theory: of 
multiple platforms and domains actively facilitating dialogue and deliberation between political 
decision-makers and affected stakeholders.102  
 
Moreover, for Eckersley, “to restrict the negotiations of any anti-pollution treaty to the biggest 
polluters and to exclude victims of pollution simply because their pollution contribution is 
negligible” seems elitist and would run against “the basic principles of communicative justice”. 
103 To address such concerns, Eckersley’s proposed model of climate club is also aimed at 
widening participation by seeking to also establish a ‘Climate Council’ comprising major 
emitters and other members drawn from among the ‘most capable’, ‘most responsible’ and the 
‘most vulnerable’ groupings of states.104 
 
Weischer et al. also highlight that lack of representation in minilateralist initiatives 
could result in privileging “the voices of those within clubs at the expense of those outside, 
reproducing existing international hierarchies,” which could also mean that the abatement goals 
and ambition remain too weak.105  
 
According to Bäckstrand et al., the picture has improved somewhat with what they term 
‘third wave minilateralism,’ which, they assess, has had positive implications for inclusiveness 
and accountability. They cite a 2017 systematic comparison of 38 clubs which indicates that 
33 of them are more open and inclusive, having foregone the ‘by-invitation-only’ approach in 
‘first and/or second wave’ minilateralist initiatives.106 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that more accountable initiatives do 
not necessarily result in optimal abatement outcomes.107 Less ‘democratic’ or ‘inclusive’ 
institutions could, conceivably, be more effective as ambition would be less vulnerable to the 
vagaries of politics inherent to multilateralism. Dillinger makes this point to illustrate that 
‘exclusive’ minilateralism – i.e. climate club arrangements which exclude non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the 175 or so states with the least emissions – may actually lead to 
the remaining parties to be better able to establish small, more responsive institutions/climate 
clubs. Moreover, there is precedent concerning ‘clubs within clubs’ in the form of concentric 
 
by elected state governments on the one hand, but excluding a large group of countries on the other, they have 
distinctive legitimacy and accountability implications….” (348 & 349). 
102 Ibid. 341.  
103 R. Eckersley, (2012) Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism? Global 
Environmental Politics 12(2): 24-42 (33).  
104 See R. Falkner (2015) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits 
and international legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change. Economics and Policy. Working Paper No. 222 (20) 
and for specific details, R. Eckersley, (2012) Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or 
Minilateralism? Global Environmental Politics 12(2): 24-42 (33).  
105 L. Weischer, J. Morgan, and M. Patel (2012) Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big 
Difference in Addressing Climate Change? RECIEL 21 (184).  
106 K. Bäckstrand, F. Zelli, & P. Schleifer (2018). The Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate 
Governance. In A. Jordan, D. Huitema, H. van Asselt, & J. Forster (Eds.), Governing Climate Change: 
Policentricity in Action, where they mention that as a consequence “more than 120 countries are members of 
climate clubs today”.  
107 Ibid, 347, where it is stated that “A glance at the wider literature on accountability in global environmental 
governance reveals further complexities and contradictions…; the rapid proliferation of accountability 
mechanisms in this domain has done little to stop the environment from deteriorating.” NB. K. Bäckstrand et al. 
are referring to the work of C. Brandi and S. Bauer, S. (2017). Climate Clubs: Potentials and Pitfalls for Enhancing 
Legitimacy in Global Climate Governance. Bonn: German Development Institute.  
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circles, including the EU and the Eurozone, as well as the United Nations (UN) and the UN 
Security Council. In that sense, climate clubs need not be inclusive per se to attain optimal 
outcomes. As Dillinger puts it,  
One of the perhaps most prevalent premises promoted in climate discourse is the notion that a 
new treaty must be highly inclusive for reasons of procedural fairness and general democracy. 
This premise is proving dated or even outright false. While many legal scholars still refer to 
‘all’ major emitters, this notion denotes the ideal of international inclusiveness that has proved 
unrealistic so far.108  
 
Let us know analyze climate clubs in the context of international trade. 
 
V. Conceptualizing climate clubs in the context of international trade 
 
1. Key considerations 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have served as laboratories of change for a long time. In 
recent times, we see they are used to move forward the sustainable-development agenda in the 
context of the World Trade Organization. That said, given the transnational nature of 
sustainable development and environmental protection, it is necessary to go beyond RTAs and 
free trade agreements (FTAs) for such issues, although regional trade is arguably a more 
effective and faster way to tackle transnational issues. There are two broad types of FTAs / 
RTAs with environmental-protection chapters: a) those like the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (EU), which deal with sustainable 
development, climate change, waste, border issues; and b) US FTAs model, which are more 
modest when it comes to dealing with trade and the environment. What follows are various 
ideas of how one could conceptualize climate clubs in the framework of the trading system. 
 
Why a regional trade agreement would be allowed under the GATT 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are defined as reciprocal trade agreements between two or 
more partners, including FTAs and customs unions. Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows regional trading arrangements to be set up as a special 
exception to the principle of non-discrimination (GATT Articles I and III), subject to strict 
criteria, including that the regional integration should complement the multilateral system and 
not threaten it. RTAs under Article XXIV should not ‘raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties’. Therefore, the RTA in question should not affect trade with a third-party 
nor divert trade from it. 
 
Why a regional trade agreement would be necessary  
Climate change discussions and, crucially, the Kyoto Protocol/the Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities principle have divided developed and developing nations by placing the focus 
on ‘responsibility’. An RTA will shift the focus to other factors, which the Kyoto Protocol 
failed to consider. Below are the following four factors: enthusiasm, power, capability, and 
institutional strength. Let us go over each one of them. 
  
• Enthusiasm: Since entering an RTA would be a voluntary step based on each party’s 
‘enthusiasm’ towards mitigating climate change, this factor would play a central role in 
defining the climate club’s constitution. The logic of carbon trade does not exist for 
 
108 M. F. Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The 'Magic 
Number' is Three (March 1, 2014). 37 Fordham Int'l L.J. 373 (2014) (405-411). 
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countries that do not recognize the need to mitigate climate change, although fewer and 
fewer countries fall under this category, as more countries (and companies) are now 
committing to being carbon neutral by 2050 or 2060. Hence, such RTA should be 
directly linked to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.    
• Power: An RTA is a diplomatically, politically, and economically sound incentive for 
non-Annex I countries to enter negotiations. However, it makes more climate sense for 
equally powerful nations to negotiate and enter into mutually binding agreements 
(despite the complexity of such negotiations) than for economically weaker countries 
to enter, potentially imbalanced, agreements with economic giants (i.e., today’s high 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters). This is because weaker nations, which are 
nevertheless low-emitting countries, would not be able to impose high binding 
standards on powerful nations.   
• Capability: The very definition of a universal organization is based on its propensity to 
accept any independent State of the international community as a member. All States 
trade goods and services, but can every State trade carbon. Does every State even 
produce carbon? The question here is why should the Vatican City be included in a 
carbon trade agreement when its ‘capability’ level is near zero? However, despite being 
qualified as developing nations, India, China and other similar developing nations have 
a high ability to trade carbon. 
This factor may even lead to a gradual substitution of the terms ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ by taking away the focus from GDP and placing it on emission units to 
distinguish between ‘carbon-rich’ and ‘carbon-poor’ states. Countries that both 
currently and in the past hardly contributed to global emissions (e.g., least-developed 
countries and small island developing states) will justifiably not face higher standards 
for emission trade/emissions reduction. In this sense, environmental ‘justice’ is still 
conserved.    
Moreover, there is only a handful of currently implemented (and rather diverse) carbon 
trading systems (either national or subnational): from the large GHG emitters of the 
world, Brazil, Russia, and India do not have any Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 
place at all. China’s is just starting up and has legal loopholes, of which the worst 
polluters will take advantage. The EU’s was launched in 2005, but barely worked 
functioned for a long time because the price of carbon was close to zero. Why not focus 
on harmonizing what already exists and establish/harmonize the ETSs for the major 
emitting countries? Why not connect existing ETSs to other regions via a carbon border 
tax? Current ETS linkages are not ambitious enough, such as California and Québec or 
the EU and Switzerland. To be successful, implementation of the ETS is key.   
• Institutional strength: Can every State have harmonized standards for carbon market 
operations (carbon market infrastructure, accounting, transparency, and environmental 
integrity)? High-institutional strength countries that also have high carbon emissions 
are the ones who will be able to create and enforce such standards to set the example 
for the rest of the world. On the other hand, low-institutional strength and/or low-
emission countries will be the ones hindering the process.   
That said, there are two main obstacles:   
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• Without a formal RTA, simply rejecting low-quality and unregulated carbon emission 
trade from some countries will be a breach of international trade law, as has been 
demonstrated in environmental-related World Trade Organization (WTO) cases (e.g., 
the Tuna-Dolphin case and the Shrimp case). These two cases have shown that there is 
a propensity for the WTO to favor trade over strict environmental protection. Put 
differently, legitimacy of high standards and regulations in terms of ‘process’ (and not 
‘product’) seems to come from regionalism, but not unilateralism/multilateralism; and   
• It will be necessary to implement a trading system that applies to ‘substantially all the 
trade,’ in accordance with GATT Article XXIV. Carbon market clubs aiming at the 
liberalization of emission units only would not meet this criterion. To meet the criterion, 
club members would be required to liberalize trade more broadly between themselves. 
That raises the question of who would be the likely partners. 
Finding partners for a future regional trade agreement 
One group of unlikely partners is China, US, the EU, Russia, India, Brazil, and Japan. These 
are the highest global carbon emitters. These parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), all together, are unlikely to enter into a mega free trade 
agreement.   
An alternative option is one of double integration: One can think of two-three clubs/groups of 
likely partners plus a regional trade agreement to unite them, thereby having double integration. 
There are existing frameworks and free trade agreements under negotiation in which carbon 
trading can be inserted as a first step. Examples are the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),109 the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, to name a few examples of mega regional trade agreements. All these 
arrangements could serve as great platforms for climate club based on green trade in goods and 
services. 
In addition, a club approach should not be inflexible in terms of membership or overemphasize 
ideal scenarios. For instance, while a US-China Agreement is one of the most obvious and 
ambitious goals, an EU-China-India Agreement would cover a similar percentage of the global 
GHG emissions. Likewise, while a US-EU-India Agreement would be more geographically 
spread out, a China-India Agreement would cover slightly more GHG emissions than the 
former.   
Why a regional trade agreement would foster future universal/multilateral discussions 
The goal of the WTO and regional trade agreements is the same, namely the liberalization of 
trade. Their only difference is the level at which the removal of barriers to trade is imposed; 
 
109 As of November 2020, the RCEP was the world’s newest and biggest RTA, but not the deepest. It eliminates 
fewer tariffs than normal RTAs. When comparing the RCEP text to that of the CPTPP, its competitor, one notes 
that in many areas the text of RCEP is not only similar, but is, in fact, identical to that of CPTPP. At the same 
time, there are significant differences between the two Agreements, even in areas where they are comparable in 
scope and adopt similar approaches. Equally, the level of economic development of the members of both mega-
RTAs (RCEP and CPTPP) is vastly different. 
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while the WTO aims to remove trade barriers at a universal level, RTAs do so at the regional 
level, for which specific requirements must be met, in accordance to GATT Article XXIV.   
Multilateralism and regionalism seem to be competing. In theory, regionalism should 
complement, not supplant, multilateralism.110 It can be argued that RTAs play a role in 
promoting multilateral free trade if they manage to multilateralize regionalism. This argument 
is even recognized formally in the first sentence of Article XXIV(4) of GATT 1994. It is 
certainly easier and more manageable to negotiate amongst a small number of large players 
than it is amongst many small players. Therefore, the creation of clubs could be utilized as a 
first step towards universalism. 
Technological cooperation 
Much more global cooperation is necessary. Around 80% of all patent applications in clean 
energy technology are owned by Japan, the US, the EU (Germany and France), South Korea, 
and the UK.111 However, many of the green technology patents have never been used due to 
either a) incapability of commercialization or b) patent suppression behavior. The latter 
phenomenon is particularly concerning even if it has been declared as legal by the US courts 
(Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co. 210 US 405 (1908)). Nonetheless, 
countries such as Brazil and South Africa have made their progression under the nationally 
determined contributions conditional on technological transfer and support.  
 
Therefore, an important part of a climate club may be to foster this technological cooperation 
through a ‘limited’ compulsory licensing amongst large GHG emitters. This idea may be more 
compelling for patent holders than making patents internationally available. In other words, 
green patents could become a climate club good to incentivize participation. This idea may be 
controversial as green patents should be ideally shared with least developed nations.  
 
However, if climate clubs’ cooperation allows large emitters to reduce their emissions, least 
developed nations could still benefit, as opposed to maintaining the current deadlock on green 
patents. Moreover, there should be some limitations to countries leaving the club once they 
obtain a patent. This is where a corporate climate club may be preferable. On technological 
cooperation, such a club may establish a mega-joint venture scheme that will bind companies 
under contractual obligations, which do not apply to States.   
 
A climate club of companies 
Companies’ involvement in climate change mitigation is fundamental, especially following 
important rising trends regarding corporation social responsibility and investor 
awareness/responsiveness towards climate change. Countries around the world are making 
laws that will make corporations accountable for environmental damage. Due to the increasing 
power of (major) companies, it would be difficult to have effective global emissions reduction 
without companies’ support.  
 
Moreover, there seems to be an apparent incompatibility between strict competition law and 
climate change law. It seems that competition law hinders effective cooperation between 
companies seeking to produce sustainable goods. A climate club agreement involving 
companies may seek to establish a clear and legitimate framework for state aid as well as 
 
110 See R. Leal-Arcas, “Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting 
Multilateralism?” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 597-629, 2011. 
111 https://www.irena.org/inspire/Intellectual-Property-Rights/Global-Patenting-Trends-in-RET 
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vertical / horizontal cooperation amongst companies to promote emissions reduction. This has 
been, to some extent, already initiated under the European Green Deal. 
 
Domestic policy preferences 
 
Part of the justification/incentive to join a climate club constitutes a need of structural economic 
reform in face of crises (including Covid-19, but also financial and international crises). One 
of the reasons why the parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership proceeded toward the conclusion 
of the CPTPP even after the US’s withdrawal was their internal motivations beyond the benefits 
derived from access to the US market. An example is Japan’s economic policy. Robert Falkner 
even notes that “getting a deal on internationally-agreed mitigation efforts is less a question of 
reducing the number of players than of the convergence of domestic policy preferences towards 
strong international action.”112 This change in domestic policy preferences towards reducing 
emissions is similar to actions taken in the face of a crisis, e.g.:   
  
• Geostrategic crises relating to energy: Where a State decides to proceed with energy 
transition/sustainable energy development to reduce energy dependence, it is likely to 
also want to participate in a climate club since it will already be decarbonizing and able 
to sell emission units. 
• Financial crises relating to economic concentration: There are States, such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, that are in the process of economic 
diversification and structural economic reform with a view to becoming less dependent 
on fossil fuel exportation. These can also be incentives to link their efforts to a climate 
club.   
• Green recovery and Covid-19: If anything, Covid-19 demonstrated the gaps in the high-
emission global supply networks. It is an opportunity to increase regional ties and even 
support countries in localizing the essential food-water-energy113 nexus. A climate club 
can be a platform setting the basis for doing so in a sustainable way.   
 
Environmental justice 
In the context of climate clubs, one obvious highlight is the concept of the free-rider theory as 
one of the main disincentives of climate action and of participation in a climate club. 
It could be argued that free riding as a concept in itself is not a problem, but a prerequisite in 
the broader context of achieving environmental justice. In other words, there are States (e.g., 
least developed nations and small island developing states (SIDS)) that have not contributed in 
the past nor contribute very much in the present to climate change. Yet, they are the main 
victims of climate change created by emissions from the major emitters. Wouldn’t it be in line 
with the principles of environmental justice to accept that fairness mandates these States to be 
‘free riders’ to the benefits of emissions reduction by major emitters simply because they are 
‘captive riders’ to negative climate change effects created by large emitters? 
 
If yes, the main issue of a climate club is to distinguish the States that should legitimately be 
allowed to be free riders and those that should not. Legitimate free riders seem to be the States 
 
112 R. Falkner, “A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and 
international legitimacy,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 87-101 [emphasis added].  
113 This third element links back to geostrategic crises and energy dependence. 
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that are adversely affected by climate change, but do not significantly benefit from activities 
contributing to it. Evidently China, India, or the GCC countries, for example, do not meet the 
criterion, despite being developing nations. Hence, this perspective shifts the focus from 
optimal exclusion to optimal inclusion. 
 
While it is accepted that not all the countries that should ideally take part in the climate club 
will actually not do so, the above should at least provide a justification for why not all countries 
must take part. 
 
2. Integrating trade and climate change policies through climate clubs114 
Multilateral treaties are dependent on a minimum of restrictions to make room for all parties 
(Leal-Arcas et al., 2020). This has generated scepticism about the possibility of creating strong 
multilateral treaties that incorporate both trade and climate policy considerations and has 
prompted some scholars to argue for a redesign of international climate treaties. William 
Nordhaus (2015) proposes the creation of smaller, regional, bilateral agreements between 
countries in “climate clubs” which are to form country groups that harmonize their climate 
policies, maintain relevant trade connections, and retain the possibility to grow into larger 
coalitions. A climate club would help to combine trade instruments and climate policy action 
to overcome the free riding issues that are present in extant agreements by creating costs of 
non-membership in the club: “A country considering whether to undertake costly abatement 
would have to weigh those costs against the potentially larger costs of reduced trade with 
countries in the club.” (“The Climate Club”, 2015).  
 
This is not a novel suggestion as numerous scholars have recognized the value of a trade-
climate policy hybrid approach and have variously argued for it. Esty relies on similarities 
between frameworks that govern trade and climate policy and points out the fact that certain 
trade and climate policy instruments, the 1994 WTO Agreement and 2030 Sustainable 
development goals respectively, have a shared goal of promoting sustainable development, 
which requires the protection of the environment (Esty, 2017). Dechezlepetre and Sato carry 
out a review of works that have analyzed the role of climate policy disparities and their impact 
on trade and show that the connections between trade and climate policy are complex and 
necessary (Dechezlepetre & Sato, 2017).  
 
Other scholars concentrating on citizen attitudes to a combined approach in the global south 
have found that there is a broad support base for the idea with citizens in a sample of countries 
preferring trade liberalization and environmental protection despite being aware that trade 
might be detrimental to the environment (Bernauer & Nguyen, 2015). While others have 
studied instances where trade agreements have already incorporated climate policy 
considerations through the use of “green language” (Ludwiszewski, 1993; Corbin, 2003), 
consensus has yet to be achieved, and the lack of a broad global agreement institutionalizing 
the incorporation of climate policy concerns into trade instruments represents a major 
institutional challenge facing climate change efforts (Esty, 2017).  
 
Achieving the consensus required for multilateral agreements is precluded by collective-action 
problems that weaken existing institutions undermining their basis as a launching pad for 
further and more comprehensive action. Bertram (2016) points out that collective action issues 
have systematically and consistently undermined the efficacy of international climate treaty 
instruments that fail to anticipate the deleterious effect of free riding and limited policy agenda 
 
114 This section has been written by Lee Guantai. 
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options. The Paris Agreement tries to enervate incentives for free riding by allowing countries 
to operate under a pledge and review setup where each country can set its own goals. The 
assumption is that countries will pick commitments at their tenable levels. This, however, fails 
to consider the free-riding incentives that undermined the Kyoto Protocol in the first place 
(Bertram, 2016).  
 
Since the free-riding incentives that haunt multilateral climate agreements are tightly linked to 
trade, it is critical to consider how international trade, as a harmful and necessary activity, and 
global climate change policy, embodied in agreements such as the Paris Agreement, can be 
mediated and configured to achieve a modus operandi that integrates trade and climate policies 
possibly through the use of climate clubs. 
 
This requires engagement with the issues that are linked to climate regulation and how it affects 
trade. Scholars have postulated two main hypotheses about how this relationship is likely to 
play out. The pollution-haven hypothesis proposes that in the case of uneven regulation policies 
around the world, pollution-intensive production will shift to low abatement areas 
(Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017). On the other hand, the Porter hypothesis holds that uneven 
policy stringency will result in technological and market leadership for industries in countries 
where such policies are enacted (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017). Research on both notions has 
yielded a mixed bag of results with findings showing that “implementing ambitious 
environmental policies can lead to small, statistically significant adverse effects on trade, 
employments, plant location, and productivity in the short run, particularly in pollution and 
energy-intensive sector” (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017). Conversely, research has also found 
that environmental regulations induce innovation in cleaner technologies but the benefits from 
such innovation do not outweigh the costs of regulation (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017). These 
mixed effects of regulation represent the policy considerations that induce free riding and make 
countries accede only to the least burdensome regulatory commitments in multilateral climate 
treaties.  
 
While revealing the ways in which climate regulations can influence trade, the previous 
arguments also demonstrate how trade affects climate regulation. Esty (2017) argues that these 
tensions can be resolved through an institutional commitment to sustainability at the highest 
levels of international economic governance.  He argues that the G20 is a body that has the 
geopolitical clout to spearhead the international endorsement of sustainability by making it a 
core principle of international cooperation (Esty, 2017). Such an approach would require the 
G20 to explicitly prohibit “pollution haven” provisions by preventing countries from relaxing 
environmental standards to attract investment. Esty (2017) points out that such a provision is 
already contained in section 114 of the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA). 
 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Bilateral Investments treaties (BITs) are some of 
the more novel and direct means through which trade can aid in sustainability efforts and 
advancing international climate policies (Leal-Arcas et al., 2020). There has been a recent 
proliferation of PTAs in the international trading system due to difficulties with the conclusion 
of multilateral trade agreements (Leal-Arcas et al., 2020). The inclusion of environmental and 
sustainable chapters in such agreements has bolstered interest in a bottom-up approach to 
climate change mitigation that circumvents circuitous multilateral treaty negotiations (Leal-
Arcas et al., 2020).  Consequently, preferential trade agreements represent a high potential area 
for new climate change approach. Especially by making it possible to build institutions that 
impose binding obligations and legal penalties for breach of regulatory principles. However, 
PTAs remain primarily instruments of trade and even though they are increasing incorporating 
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far reaching environmental regulation provisions, their core emphasis will be on economic 
growth and economic gain rather than environmental or social progress (Esty, 2017).   
 
Consequently, the tensions between trade and climate policy regulation that produce competing 
incentives remain a stumbling block for sustainable development. Multilateral treaties are 
clunky and lack the ability to marshal necessary impetus for change. PTAs and other trade 
instruments can only realign trade and climate policy to a limited extent and even the G20 
proposal that Esty puts forth involves countries with the largest incentives for non-punitive 
climate policies. Containing climate policies and trade in a practical instrument requires a new 
design ordering how countries solve collective-action problems, especially those arising at the 
nexus of large-issue areas. 
 
The climate club hypothesis is far from being an alternative for existing treaty institutions and, 
as Nordhaus himself points out, is a utopian idea. Conditions necessary for successful club 
formation, however, are present in the case of climate and trade policy mediation and support 
the idea of climate club formation. These conditions include the existence of a sharable public-
good-type resource, cooperative benefits for each member of the group, penalties for non-
members at relatively low costs for members, and that membership is stable and enduring 
(Nordhaus, 2015). Consequently, it is possible that the climate club represent an efficient 
cooperative strategy and the best mechanism for reducing the commitment problems of extant 
climate agreements (Nordhaus, 2015.) 
 
However, this is not so straightforward since the existence of multilateral environmental 
agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol is based on the compelling idea that, as the coalition 
increases to include all countries, the global level of abatement will tend towards an efficient 
rate, i.e., a global equilibrium of benefits and trade-offs to members that makes the agreement 
self-reinforcing (Nordhaus, 2015). On the other hand, smaller coalitions, such as those that are 
likely to be present in the early stage of climate club formation, are notoriously unstable, with 
much of their success relying on “the structure of payoffs and the stability of the concept” 
(Nordhaus, 2015). Furthermore, while smaller coalitions are efficient when they work, as the 
coalition grows, as Nordhaus envisions the climate clubs will over time, the same efficiency 
problems that plague larger coalitions will likely creep in (Nordhaus, 2015). Consequently, the 
use of climate clubs as alternatives to overcome the collective action challenges of large 
member agreements will require that there be a sound design that factors in important aspects 
of both small and large coalitions.  
 
Possible climate club designs 
These aspects include mechanisms for fostering individual rationality and group rationality 
which are linked to the creation of self-reinforcing treaties (Nordhaus, 2015; Barret, 1994). 
Individual rationality entails the creation of membership incentives for each member while 
collective rationality entails the creation of group benefits and non-member penalties. Perhaps 
a suitable climate club design would anticipate the efficiency issues of large coalitions and the 
stability challenges of smaller coalitions by making use of trade instruments such as 
preferential trade agreements or free trade agreements, which have mechanisms for exacting 
penalties (Leal-Arcas et al., 2020). Indeed, one possible climate design can entail trade 
agreements with climate provisions that are binding and specific, between high volume trading 
partners, reduction goals agreed upon by the coalition countries but significantly tougher than 
international reduction goals, and entail a minimum time limit during which the members of 
the coalition cannot exit the group or allow new members.  
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This design entails a higher level of commitment and creates clear reduction goals. The term 
limits help overcome the stability challenges of small coalitions while enabling members to 
benefit from the non-membership penalties paid by countries outside the coalition. This is 
particularly important since as Dechezlepetre and Sato (2017) point out countries that move to 
regulate pollution first often suffer certain disadvantages in terms of trade. Admittedly, such a 
design represents a high threshold and is imaginable only for those countries with resolutely 
intertwined climate and trade policy considerations.  
 
Perhaps the best climate club design would have a two-tier system, where the latter design 
would be the higher-tier design to which countries would ascend from a low tier club design 
based on tacit obligatory agreements, instead of binding ones. The lower tier club design would 
enable countries to try out various climate change regulation means while setting up the 
institutions required to successfully join the higher tier climate club. Allowing countries to 
learn and make gradual improvements to the investments required for the successful operation 
of regulatory coalitions.  
 
William Nordhaus’s climate club represents the best mechanism for climate policy action at 
the international level and, arguably, at a domestic level too. As Bertram (2016) notes, it 
enables countries with incentive compatibility to work together as they forge their national 
strategies, avoiding premature unilateral action. Such club also provides a focal point around 
which international negotiations may be organized (Bertram, 2016). Additionally, Bertram 
(2016) notes the appeal that such clubs would have for allowing countries “not to bind their 
citizens to anything unless and until a coalition of some minimal credible size emerges”. This 
is in line with our proposal for the climate club design into two separate tiers, with the lower 
tier allowing countries a probationary period before entering into serious commitment 
partnership in the higher tier clubs. The use of PTAs and agreed-upon tariffs in the higher tier 
club combined with the non-membership penalties makes the climate club a potential self-
sustaining model for sustainable development and, if and when countries agree to coalesce into 
such groups, will be a sinecure providing huge benefits at low enforcement costs. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has provided an overview of the key considerations in the relevant discourse 
exploring or advocating minilateralist approaches to global climate governance. Analysis of 
the literature in connection to the minilateralist landscape suggests that existing climate clubs 
function either as dialogue or implementation forums, and that their implications for 
multilateralism vary. Some club-like arrangements may have synergistic fragmentative effects, 
others cooperative, while yet others may have conflictive effects for global climate governance. 
 
Furthermore, they vary in their content: some may be predicated on carbon market 
arrangements, while others may have more specific policies to encourage financing, increased 
energy efficiency, or other modalities explored throughout this publication.  
 
Moreover, the multilateralist setting (UNFCCC and subsequent agreements) contains 
scope for minilateralism. This is apparent also in the bottom-up nature of the Paris 
Agreement115 that encourages coalitions of the willing, including among states and private 
actors. That being said, the current minilateralist landscape does not appear to be achieving 
 
115 See World Bank. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2020 (May), World Bank, Washington, DC. (87) for 
more detail on the bottom-up approach to addressing climate change within the context of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement.  
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gains on a par or higher than what could have been achieved within the UNFCCC multilateralist 
regime. In that sense, climate club arrangements need to be impactful in order to secure buy-in 
and optimal abatement. However, that remains the greatest challenge: namely how to surmount 
the very dynamics that are present in multilateralism. How to co-opt the most impactful actors 
has received considerable scholarly attention, as have questions of what may be the golden 
mean when it comes to the configuration of members. The findings are not straightforward, as 
they are contingent on a multiplicity of factors.  
 
What is more, the literature, for the most part, contains prescriptive insights into the 
features and configuration of prospective members for optimal club-like arrangements. The 
obvious features would be substantial ambition over and above current commitment levels. 
However, incentivizing participation to ambitious abatement commitments potentially 
harboring costly and anticompetitive effects relies on striking a shrewd balance between, on 
the one hand, exclusive club-like benefits for members and, on the other, impactful penalties 
for non-members. Sufficient benefits draw in those reluctant states that face high abatement 
costs. Penalties also incentivize buy-in when they are sufficiently impactful.  
 
However, as is to be explored in subsequent parts of the present publication, there are 
considerable administrative and legal intricacies that would need to be addressed when it comes 
to the imposition of conditions or penalties (e.g. through the requirement for emission 
allowances and/or the imposition of levies, including import tariffs or carbon taxation affecting 
the end price of the goods or services from non-members). Concerns include the erosion of the 
current multilateral trade order – itself a considerable multilateralist achievement of the post-
WWII order – what with the inherent threat of countermeasures when it comes to the unilateral 
imposition of uniform tariffs or carbon taxes to non-member exports. In that sense, 
minilateralist solutions need to address and explore all known-knowns and unknown-knowns, 
respectively, when it comes to blowback to the multilateralism concerning global climate 
governance and global trade governance.  
 
What is more, it is no less an intricate matter to arrive at the precise configuration of 
participants for optimal outcomes. That being said, the literature suggests that one need not 
obsess with including all or any of the highest emitters from the outset. While optimal 
emissions coverage is the ideal116  – an ideal after all that multilateralism has historically failed 
to attain – it need not be the starting point for club formation. Focusing on how to design and 
promote an effective, incrementalist solution could yield results in terms of advancing climate 
diplomacy, including facilitating ‘great power’ dialogue, research and development, 
investment, and informational and technological exchange. 
 
While the relevant literature, for the most part, expresses an optimistic albeit cautious 
view on climate clubs,117 it is reasonable to argue that such minilateralist arrangements, when 
 
116 See R. Gampfer (2014) UNFCCC v. Minilateralism: Effects on agreement design features on support for global 
climate governance architectures, ETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International Studies (4). Gampfer 
lists a series of hypotheses including that, support for minilateralism in prospective member as well as non-
member countries is higher the larger the share of global emissions regulated under a climate club arrangement. 
117 Aptly summed up by Falkner when stating that “minilateralism offers no panacea for the ills of climate 
multilateralism. Most critically, climate clubs cannot pressurize or induce reluctant great powers to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, a realistic approach to climate minilateralism, focused on coalitions of the 
willing, holds the promise of moving us beyond the current stalemate in international climate negotiations. The 
rise of minilateralism, often decried as a sign of the disintegration of the postwar multilateral order, can be 
harnessed to strengthen an increasingly polycentric field of global governance.” (emphasis added) R. Falkner 
(2015) A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits and international 
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pertaining to more ambitious policies within a small yet impactful coalition of the mighty and 
the willing, could certainly catalyze the existing state of global climate diplomacy by providing 
economic pressure but also moral leadership to co-opt non-members and thus expand 
progressively towards multilateralism. While legitimacy, inclusiveness, and accountability are 
not essential for the success of such minilateralist initiatives, addressing those concerns by, for 
instance, sufficiently subjecting or otherwise linking to multilateralist (i.e. UNFCCC) scrutiny 
could go some way to allay related concerns and encourage public acceptance.  
 
In sum, many misconceptions surround climate diplomacy discourse. States ought not 
strive for ideals and perfection, but for realism and effect. Effective climate clubs may contain 
pathways to optimal abatement efforts at the inter-state and transnational levels.  
VII. Looking to the Future 
 
Few people in the rich world may want to volunteer to reduce their living standards. At the 
same time, it is difficult to ask people from parts of the world that are still developing to 
sacrifice their chance to become rich. A middle-ground compromise could be technology that 
brings economies away from using fossil fuels as their principal source of energy. Technology 
could be instrumental to understand the links between international trade, sustainable 
development, and environmental protection, which have become increasingly important to 
understand how we can reach a sustainable future. We know by now that international trade 
can help decarbonize the economy and create jobs. This duality can be reached through the 
liberalization of trade in green goods, the circular economy, border carbon adjustment 
mechanisms (BCAM), or the blue economy, to mention but a few. 
 
 The WTO Agreement clearly states in its preamble that the international community 
should pursue free trade in the context of sustainable development. As a result, the future of 
the world economy cannot be separated from the future of the environment. This means that 
we need to re-imagine the rules of international trade (whether multilateral, regional, bilateral) 
for sustainable development. It also means that free trade needs to be consistent with 
environmental protection. This article concludes that potential trade concerns should not be an 
obstacle for the formation of a club of carbon markets in a climate club. 
 
One wonders whether existing WTO rules are sufficient for the envisaged 
transformation towards a low-carbon society in the context of the EU’s Green Deal or is it 
necessary to have a new agreement/interpretation of existing rules (e.g., on BCAM or 
subsidies)? If this is a necessary step, should it be part of an overall WTO multilateral reform 
package discussion or a separate discussion with a possible plurilateral agreement? If it is a 
plurilateral agreement outside the WTO, would that pose a risk for the most-favored-nation 
principle, which is a core principle in WTO law? 
 
 Going forward, the international community should aim at concluding agreements to 
eliminate barriers and tariffs on green goods; it should eliminate barriers to trade in 
 
legitimacy. Centre for Climate Change. Economics and Policy. Working Paper No. 222 (27). Also see A. Hagen 
and K. Eisenack (2015) International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs v. 
Global Cooperation, 20th Coalition Theory Network Workshop (2015, March 19-20), Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei, Venice, Italy, where it is stated that it can generally be shown that “climate clubs are at least not detrimental 
to global cooperation…we need to conclude that the idea that climate clubs do benefit global climate protection 
has to be taken with precaution.” (18).  
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environmental services; it should put an end to fisheries subsidies; and both the WTO and the 
World Bank should work together to phase down and gradually out fossil fuel subsidies, which 
are diametrically opposed to climate change mitigation. Moreover, the WTO rules (and other 
rules of international trade) should be drafted through the prism of sustainable development to 
serve the needs of the 21st century. This may only be achieved via plurilateral agreements, not 
multilaterally, since the WTO has proven time and time again that it is not feasible. For 
instance, a group of like-minded countries could take this initiative. In addition, carbon border 
adjustment mechanisms throughout the world may help put a price on carbon via a carbon tax. 
With climate a major global priority, it remains to be seen whether the EU will disrupt the 
global trading system as it will inevitably implement carbon border adjustment taxes. 
 
 In recent years, and certainly since the collapse of multilateral trade negotiations in 
2008, we have seen the rise of FTAs. Recent FTAs have environmental chapters that promote 
environmental protection. A case in point is USMCA, although its deficiency is that anything 
related to climate change is omitted in the agreement. The good news is that many countries 
are promoting climate change-related technology and many governments throughout the world 
would like to see a pro-climate agenda in their trade policies (largely because it is in their 
interest—both in terms of health for their citizens and economic sustainability—to do so). That 
may mean trade restrictions as part of climate change mitigation measures. 
 
 The future trade agenda is full of mega-trends, side-effects of geopolitical conflicts (like 
that between the US and China, which will most likely be the most important bilateral 
relationship in the world for years to come in fields such as energy security, international trade, 
climate change, or finance, to name but a few),118 it is about e-commerce (especially when it 
comes to data flows), as well as open, sustainable, and assertive trade. More cooperation in 
areas such as climate change and public health is urgently required. The recovery from covid-
19 will imply the interaction between international trade policy and domestic policies and that 
trade policy is an enabler of other domestic policies. Countries are prioritizing the 
implementation and enforcement of their FTAs, especially the sustainability commitments in 
FTAs. A case in point where sustainability is at the heart of trade policy is the EU-Mercosur 
FTA, as without sustainability clauses, there would be no political support in the EU for the 
ratification of this FTA as of early 2021. In fact, the notion of sustainability is present in all 
labor and environmental protection chapters in recent EU FTAs.  
 
Equally, an increasing number of countries are aiming at carbon neutrality by 2050 or 
2060 (which is perceived as benign unilateralism) as well as greater integration of trade policy 
with other domestic policies (such as sustainability—in its three dimensions, namely 
development, environmental, and social—and the digital economy). Similarly, governments 
could enact policies that greener consumption. Putting a price on carbon is a good way forward, 
making sure that companies and consumers pay for their emissions. 
 
Lastly, we should not underestimate the phenomenal positive impact green technology 
can have on climate change mitigation. In recent times, there have been scientists stating 
negative views on the future of humanity and that humans should forget about solving the 
climate crisis and, instead, invest their efforts and money in migrating from Earth to other 
 
118 President Xi of China speaks of ‘ecological civilization’ to show its assertiveness in becoming a climate leader. 
Areas for potential cooperation with the US are, among others, carbon capture and storage, hydrogen power, and 
the development of green financial instruments to fund such cooperation. That said, Chinese leaders seem cautious 
in their bilateral relations with the West, which they see as a region of the world in economic decline and political 
instability, as opposed to the economic rise and social stability of China. 
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planets. However, technology evolves very rapidly. The current debate is that green hydrogen 
will guarantee a sustainable future for our planet. For instance, hydrogen sustains three times 
as much energy as kerosene and is lighter. In addition, public spending in research and 
technology is growing in most OECD countries, and more and better subsidies for R&D may 
take place.119 
 
Therefore, there are many reasons to believe that tomorrow’s technology will be able 
to tackle climate change effectively, especially if we continue to invest in green technology. In 
addition, many countries increasingly have green policies. Technological advancement is a 
clear example of human progress and, as a result, governments and companies should aim at 
the promotion of green technology to fight climate change. This can be done with the creation 
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